OPEN LETTER FROM CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS CONCERNING ASEAN’S APPROACH TO THE ONGOING POLITICAL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN MYANMAR

To: ASEAN Leaders

H.E. Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah Mu’izzaddin Waddaulah, Prime Minister of Brunei Darussalam
H.E. Hun Sen, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Cambodia
H.E. Joko Widodo, President of the Republic of Indonesia
H.E. Thongloun Sisoulith, Prime Minister of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic
H.E. Dato’ Sri Ismail Sabri bin Yaakob, Prime Minister of Malaysia
H.E. Ferdinand Romualdez Marcos, Jr., President of the Republic of the Philippines
H.E. Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of the Republic of Singapore
H.E. Prayut Chan-o-cha, Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand
H.E. Phạm Minh Chính, Prime Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam

25 October 2022

Subject: Open letter from civil society organizations concerning ASEAN’s approach to the ongoing political, human rights and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar

Your Excellencies,

We, the 457 undersigned Myanmar, regional and international civil society organizations, call on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (‘ASEAN’) to cease inviting all political and non-political representatives of the Myanmar military junta to all summits and meetings, and revise the mandate of the Special Envoy to Myanmar. We further call on ASEAN under the Indonesian Chairship, as a regional bloc and as individual states, to move beyond the failed Five-Point Consensus (‘5PC’), enable effective humanitarian assistance, and publicly recognize the National Unity Government.

For the past 20 months since the failed coup, ASEAN has been largely ineffective in responding to the escalating crisis in Myanmar. ASEAN’s “dialogue” demonstrates a selective approach to the 5PC and yields no results to stop the ongoing crisis in Myanmar. Despite being put on notice for non-compliance with the 5PC in a joint communique in August 2022, the junta has continued committing atrocity crimes against the Myanmar people. Just one month after the warning, the junta’s airstrikes on a school in Sagaing Region killed 11 children.

The exclusion of the junta from ASEAN Summits in October 2021 and November 2022 was a step in the right direction. We also note positive stances taken by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore, and welcome the bloc’s statement in July 2022. Nevertheless, any engagement with the junta is in breach of the ASEAN Charter. The crimes that are being committed by the Myanmar military amount to acts of a terrorist organization under international legal definitions and Myanmar’s domestic laws. The Myanmar military stands accused of atrocity crimes at the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, and under a universal jurisdiction case in Argentina. We are alarmed that this illegal entity holds sway in ASEAN’s actions.

Mandate of Special Envoy

Since the establishment of the desultory 5PC, the mandate of the ASEAN Special Envoy (‘SE’) has proven unsuccessful in resolving, let alone positively impacting, the worsening crisis in Myanmar. Several efforts by the SE, and by extension of ASEAN, to initiate “dialogues” and “visits” to the military junta have not actualized in any meaningful progress. Instead, such actions have condoned and emboldened the illegal junta to continue its heinous crimes with blanket impunity.

Evident in the visits by the second SE, Cambodian Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn, in March and June 2022, the junta has been reassured of ASEAN’s inaction and launched intense aerial attacks against civilians and spiked the death toll of children. State Counsellor, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was repeatedly given additional prison sentences, along with her economic adviser, Sean Turnell. It is a shame that, per the junta’s disapproval, in none of the visits was the SE allowed access to the State Counsellor and other arbitrarily detained parliamentarians elected in the November 2020 general elections. The SE has further failed to meet with the Acting President, Prime Minister or other officials of the National Unity Government (‘NUG’), the legitimate government of Myanmar, key ethnic revolutionary organizations (‘EROs’) and civil society organizations (‘CSOs’).

The junta was emboldened to carry out extrajudicial executions of four political activists in July despite the appeal from ASEAN Chair, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen. The executions clearly demonstrated, as Singapore’s Foreign Minister put it, “the high level of cynicism or even outright disrespect for the role of ASEAN”. We are deeply disappointed that such a reprehensible action, which may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity, was met with no more than empty condemnation.

These imprudent engagements of the SE further caused extensive damage to the struggle of Myanmar people to end military tyranny and establish a federal democracy. Such actions stand in contrast to the 5PC’s promise to strive for a solution “in the interests of the people”. Furthermore, the vague nature of the SE mandate has so far created public confusion of whether the mandate is a political mediator, interlocutor or focused on humanitarian delivery.

Humanitarian Aid and AHA Centre

ASEAN’s ongoing cooperation and engagement with the military junta to deliver humanitarian aid through the bloc’s Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (‘AHA Centre’) has only exacerbated the humanitarian crisis. The AHA Centre, designed to tackle natural disasters, is ill-equipped to deal with a multi-dimensional political crisis. With its operating procedures, the Centre relies on the junta for access and is dictated by a board consisting of the junta’s Myanmar Task Force. Aid is being weaponized by the very perpetrators of crimes against humanity and war crimes that led to the ongoing humanitarian crisis, and of the genocide of the Rohingya in 2017. The former director of the AHA Centre stated that the junta “is unwilling to provide access to the people in line with humanitarian principles,” and called on ASEAN to remove the junta as aid partner.

Local humanitarian actors and CSOs have been effectively delivering the much-needed humanitarian assistance to communities since the failed coup, along with the NUG and EROs. Border-based CSOs have been indispensable in assisting groups in hardest-to-reach areas with financial and subsistence support. The NUG provided 2.73 billion Myanmar Kyat to internally displaced people and the Civil Disobedience Movement in a year. Meanwhile, international humanitarian organizations, UN agencies and the AHA Centre have been largely unable to reach those most in need. In his letter to the ASEAN Secretary-General, the Malaysian Foreign Minister noted that “the special [humanitarian] task force formed by ASEAN together with the junta is not working well”. With the lack of trust in the junta as a result of its ongoing campaign of terror and weaponization of aid, local aid providers are increasingly unwilling to work with the junta or organizations linked to it.

Recommendations

While Myanmar people themselves are sacrificing their lives, livelihoods and futures for the future of their young generations, ASEAN must take concrete actions to end all inhumane acts committed by the military junta. We appeal to the Indonesian President, set to assume ASEAN Chairship in 2023, to support the will of the Myanmar people.

It is imperative that ASEAN no longer holds official meetings with the junta or recognizes it and its representatives as the government of Myanmar. The bloc must bar all junta representatives, political and non-political, from all ASEAN summits and meetings, including the ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) and the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR). Such disengagement must include ending defense ties with the Myanmar junta. ASEAN must officially recognize the NUG, allowing its delegation to the bloc and member states.

We strongly urge ASEAN to move beyond the 5PC and develop a plan that includes clear benchmarks and indicators of success to realistically measure progress. The plan must be based on extensive consultation with the NUG, the National Unity Consultative Council (‘NUCC’), EROs and CSOs. ASEAN must establish actionable punitive measures upon the junta’s non-compliance with the 5PC to cease the ongoing violence.

At the November Summit, we also call on ASEAN to amend the mandate of the SE to be a full-time position from 2023 onwards with a three-year term, appointed by the ASEAN Chair, and to represent and be accountable to ASEAN as a whole. The SE must have clear terms of reference not for peace-brokering, but be grounded in human rights principles, justice and accountability, and the will of the Myanmar people. The mandate must hold authority and independence to take actions unencumbered by the delay of infrequent ASEAN high-level meetings. The mandate must immediately open formal communications and engage with the NUG, the NUCC, EROs, CSOs and the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw.

On humanitarian aid, ASEAN must stop partnering with the junta and recognize that the AHA Centre cannot address the humanitarian crisis. We recommend to ASEAN to take a solidarity-based approach to facilitate cross-border aid by working in partnership with local humanitarian actors, the NUG and EROs. ASEAN members must also accept and provide protection for asylum seekers from Myanmar. All regional efforts must be based on humanitarian principles of do-no-harm, humanity and impartiality, and the agency of displaced communities.

The political, human rights and humanitarian crisis in Myanmar is not merely an “internal affair,” but a threat to regional security and stability which ASEAN vowed to protect. Without swift action, Myanmar’s neighboring countries and ASEAN states will continue to face the influx of refugees, loss of commercial interests and irreparable reputational damage. We believe that ASEAN’s credibility depends on its ability to act in a timely manner to effectively prevent the junta’s violence and destruction spilling over and destabilizing the entire region.

We CSOs remain at your disposal to ensure the bloc’s effective action in addressing the needs of Myanmar people in line with their will and aspirations.

For more information, please contact:

  • Khin Ohmar, Progressive Voice, info@progressive-voice.org
  • Naw Hser Hser, Women’s League of Burma, equality20@protonmail.com
  • Carlos Sardiña Galache, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, carlos@aseanmp.org

Signed by 457 organizations including 297 organizations who have chosen not to disclose their name:  

  1. Action Committee for Democracy Development (Coalition of 14 grassroots networks)
  2. Active Youths (Kalaymyo)
  3. All Arakan Students’ and Youths’ Congress (AASYC)
  4. All Burma Indigenous People Alliance (ABIPA)
  5. Alliance for Democracy in Myanmar (Western USA)
  6. ALTSEAN-Burma
  7. Anti Dictatorship in Burma – DC Metropolitan Area
  8. Anyar Taw Eain
  9. Arakan CSO Network
  10. Arakan Rivers Network (ARN)
  11. Arakan Workers’ Organization
  12. ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR)
  13. Asia Pacific Solidarity Coalition (APSOC)
  14. Asian Democracy Network
  15. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
  16. Asians Cultural Forum on Development Foundation (ACFOD)
  17. Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
  18. Association of Human Rights Defenders and Promoters
  19. Association Suisse – Birmanie
  20. Athan – Freedom of Expression Activist Organization
  21. Ayeyarwaddy Youth Network
  22. Back Pack Health Worker Team
  23. Bago MATA
  24. Buddhist Solidarity Association
  25. Burma Action Ireland
  26. Burma Campaign UK
  27. Burma Human Rights Network
  28. Burma Medical Association
  29. Burmese Women’s Union
  30. Cambodian American and Friends for Democracy and Human Rights advocate, USA
  31. Cambodian Center for Human Rights (CCHR)
  32. Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association (ADHOC Cambodia)
  33. Cambodian League for the Promotion and Defense of Human Rights (LICADHO)
  34. Campaign for a New Myanmar
  35. Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD)
  36. Chin Community SF Bay Area
  37. Chin Human Rights Organization
  38. Chin MATA
  39. Chin Resources Center
  40. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
  41. Community Resource Centre (CRC)
  42. Cross Cultural Foundation (CrCF)
  43. Danu Youth Organization
  44. Democracy for Ethnic Minorities Organization
  45. Democracy, Peace and Women’s Organization
  46. Democratic Youth Council
  47. Educational Initiatives Myanmar
  48. ENLAWTHAI Foundation (EnLAW)
  49. Equality Myanmar
  50. ETOs Watch Coalition
  51. Federal FM Mandalay
  52. Foundation of Khmer Samaki, USA
  53. Free Burma Campaign (South Africa) (FBC- SA)
  54. Free Myanmar Inc.
  55. Friends Without Borders
  56. Future Light Center
  57. Future Thanlwin
  58. Generation Wave
  59. Grass-root People
  60. Human Rights and Development Foundation (HRDF)
  61. Human Rights Educators Network
  62. Human Rights Foundation of Monland
  63. Human Rights Lawyers Association
  64. In Defense of Human Rights and Dignity Movement (iDEFEND) Philippines
  65. India for Myanmar
  66. Info Birmanie
  67. Initiatives for International Dialogue
  68. Institute for Asian Democracy
  69. Inter Pares
  70. International Campaign for the Rohingya
  71. Jagriti Child and Youth Concern Nepal
  72. Just Associates Southeast Asia (JASS SEA)
  73. Justice For Myanmar
  74. Kachin Women’s Association Thailand
  75. Karen Association of Ireland
  76. Karen Human Rights Group
  77. Karen Peace Support Network
  78. Karen Women’s Organization
  79. Karen Youth Ireland
  80. Karenni Civil Society Network
  81. Karenni National Women’s Organization
  82. Kayaw Women’s Organization
  83. Keng Tung Youth
  84. KontraS Indonesia
  85. Kyae Lak Myay
  86. Kyaukse University Students’ Union
  87. La communauté BIRMANE de France
  88. Let’s Help Each Other
  89. Los Angeles Myanmar Movement (LA2M)
  90. Mandalay Youth Association
  91. Me Boun Foundation
  92. Metta Campaign Mandalay
  93. Migrant Workers Rights Network (MWRN)
  94. Migrant Working Group (MWG)
  95. Mindanao Peacebuilding Institute Foundation, Inc
  96. Minority Affairs Institute – MAI (Myanmar)
  97. Mon State Development Center
  98. Monywa People’s Strike Steering Committee
  99. Myanmar Accountability Project (MAP)
  100. Myanmar Alliance for Transparency and Accountability
  101. Myanmar Campaign Network
  102. Myanmar Democratic Force in Denmark
  103. Myanmar People Alliance (Shan State)
  104. Myaung Education Network
  105. Myaung Medical Team
  106. Network for Advocacy Action
  107. Network for Human Rights Documentation Network – Burma (ND-Burma)
  108. No Business With Genocide
  109. Non-Binary Thailand
  110. Nway Oo Guru Lay Myar
  111. Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica
  112. Oway Institute
  113. Padauk Phue – Blooming Padauk
  114. Pakokku Youth Development Council
  115. Peace and Culture Foundation
  116. People’s Empowerment Foundation (PEF)
  117. People’s Goal
  118. Progressive Voice
  119. Protection International
  120. Save and Care Organization for Ethnic Women at Border Areas
  121. Save Myanmar – USA
  122. Sea Junction
  123. Second Tap Root
  124. Shan MATA
  125. Shape-Sea
  126. Sisters 2 Sisters
  127. Social Garden
  128. Social Action for Community and Development (Cambodia)
  129. Southeast Asia Freedom of Expression Network (SAFEnet)
  130. Southern Youth Development Association
  131. Southern Youth Development Organization
  132. Spirit in Education Movement (SEM)
  133. Swedish Burma Committee
  134. Swedish Foundation for Human Rights
  135. Synergy – Social Harmony Organization
  136. Ta’ang Women’s Organization
  137. Taiwan Association for Human Rights
  138. Tanintharyi MATA
  139. Tanitharyi People’s Voice
  140. Tanitharyi Women’s Network
  141. Thai Action Committee for Democracy in Burma (TACDB)
  142. Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR)
  143. The Ladies
  144. The Mekong Butterfly
  145. The Regional Center for Social Science and Sustainable Development
  146. Thint Myat Lo Thu Myar Organization
  147. Together Thanlyin
  148. U.S. Campaign for Burma
  149. Union for Civil Liberty (UCL)
  150. US Advocacy Coalition for Myanmar (USACM)
    1. Campaign for a New Myanmar
    2. Students for Free Burma (SFB)
    3. Freedom for Burma
    4. International Campaign for The Rohingya
    5. Helping Hands for Burma (H2B)
    6. Global Movement for Myanmar Democracy (GM4MD)
    7. Chin Leaders of Today &Tomorrow
  151. Vorapat Veerapattanakup, Human Rights Activism
  152. Women Advocacy Coalition – Myanmar
  153. Women’s League of Burma
  154. Women’s Peace Network
  155. Yangon Medical Network
  156. Youths for Community-Myaung
  157. တူမီး-တော်လှန်ရေးစာစဉ်
  158. ဒို့မြေကွန်ရက် (LIOH)
  159. ပွင့်ဖြူလယ်ယာမြေကွန်ရက်
  160. မြစ်ကွေ့ – လူထုတော်လှန်ရေးစာစဉ်

Additional 297 organizations have chosen not to disclose their name.


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Regime forces attacked with drones after decapitating teacher

The junta troops responsible for murdering the teacher and two others in Magway’s Pauk Township on Monday also burned down an entire village late last week

A resistance group says that it used drones to launch two attacks on a junta column that decapitated a teacher and killed two others in Magway Region’s Pauk Township earlier this week.

In a statement released on Thursday, the Anonymous Special Task Force said that it dropped three explosives on around 80 troops stationed on a hill near Hpayar Taung, a village located about 15km southeast of the town of Pauk, the day before.

An officer of the group also claimed that a second attack was carried out against a junta base in Yae Pyar, a village about 2km south of Hpayar Taung, later the same day.

“We weren’t sure how many casualties there were from the first attack, so we decided to go after the base in Yae Pyar as well,” he told Myanmar Now.

The troops stationed near Hpayar Taung have reportedly been raiding villages in southern Pauk Township since October 12. On Monday, they targeted the village of Kyar Pyit Kan, where they abducted three men, including a teacher taking part in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM).
Payataung_pauk.jpg

Hpayar Taung, where junta troops were attacked on October 19 after beheading CDM teacher Saw Moe Tun (Pyae Phyo Aung)

Hpayar Taung, where junta troops were attacked on October 19 after beheading CDM teacher Saw Moe Tun (Pyae Phyo Aung)

According to locals, the teacher, 46-year-old Saw Moe Tun, taught mathematics at a school run by the National Unity Government (NUG) and was also on its township education committee.

“They captured him and took him to Taung Myint, another village near here. That’s where they killed him, right in front of the school. They cut three fingers off of his right hand and also beheaded him. They hung his head at the entrance to the school,” said a local who did not want to be named.

Another person living in the area confirmed this report, and said that the soldiers also set fire to the school.

A photo of the victim’s head hanging from a school door, with his headless body lying nearby on the ground, has circulated widely on social media.

The other two men, who have yet to be identified, were also killed, local sources said.

According to local groups, around 8,000 civilians from some 13 villages have been displaced by the recent junta raids in Pauk Township.

Last Thursday, a day after the attacks began, soldiers burned down the entire village of Thee Chauk, the Anonymous Special Task Force officer told Myanmar Now.

The village, which is about 20km west of Hpayar Taung, where the junta troops were stationed, had around 250 households, he said. Before setting fire to most of the houses there, the regime forces shelled and ransacked the village, he added.

On Tuesday, the Basic Education General Strike Committee and Basic Education Workers Union-Strike Committee released statements strongly condemning the military’s brutal killing of Saw Moe Tun.

Both groups also noted that on the same day that Saw Moe Tun was murdered, Ye Thiha, a middle school headmaster who was also taking part in the CDM, was fatally stabbed seven times at his home in Ayeyarwady Region’s Zalun Township.

The groups called on the public, as well as the NUG, to protect teachers and others taking part in the CDM.

Myanmar Now News

Outgunned resistance forces kill four police in Natmauk village

More than 150 people were forcibly detained following the incident, which occurred after local defence team members encountered a group of police on patrol

A group of nine local defence team members killed four police officers during a half-hour clash in Magway Region’s Natmauk Township on Sunday, according to resistance sources.

The incident occurred at around 9pm in Hpat Taw Yae, a village about 25km east of the town of Natmauk, after the defence team members encountered eight officers on patrol.

The regime forces, who may have included some soldiers, were fully armed, while the defence team members only had a pistol, a rifle, and several swords between them, according to a member of one of the groups involved in the clash.

“The guys with the guns fired back at the police, and when more junta personnel arrived on motorcycles, we started attacking them with swords,” said Garuda Force officer Bo Aung Din.

Outgunned, the defence team members were forced to retreat, but not before seizing the weapons of two of the deceased officers.

“We only had 14 bullets, so we saved the last one to go back and grab as many guns as we could get. But we only managed to get two,” said Bo Aung Din.

He added that one member of his group was shot in the thigh and back while retrieving the guns, but was not seriously injured.

According to Htan Htut, the information officer for the Beikthano People’s Defence Force (PDF), which also took part in the confrontation, three of the officers were killed in the initial exchange of fire, while the fourth died while attempting to flee.

“Three of them died right away, and the other one was killed while trying to get to his motorcycle,” he said.
Natmauk_phattawyay_2_18.10.Jpeg

Guns seized from police officers killed by a local defence team in the village of Hpat Taw Yae on October 16 (Supplied)

Guns seized from police officers killed by a local defence team in the village of Hpat Taw Yae on October 16 (Supplied)

Residents of Hpat Taw Yae told Myanmar Now that a column of around 60 junta soldiers arrived in the village about two hours after the clash and arrested more than 150 people.

While some 70 women were released the following day, all of the men who were detained remain in custody and have been subjected to beatings, the locals said.

They added that the regime forces had even arrested 14-year-old seventh graders and also set fire to five houses in the village.

Residents of several neighbouring villages, including Thapoot Pin, Kyauk Oh, and Kantha, have also reportedly been displaced since the arrival of the junta troops in Hpat Taw Yae.

Natmauk Township is located east of the Ayeyarwady River, in an area that is mostly flat, open land. Unlike the heavily wooded western side of the river, where most resistance groups in Magway Region are based, it offers few natural hiding places. 

The town is also famous as the birthplace of independence hero Aung San, who is also the father of Myanmar’s ousted civilian leader, Aung San Suu Kyi.

Myanmar Now News

Bomb blasts, gunfire at Myanmar’s biggest prison kills eight, including guards 

Prison staff and civilians are reportedly among those killed after shots are allegedly fired from a watchtower at Yangon’s Insein Prison following a parcel bomb attack

At least eight people were killed and 15 injured after Yangon’s notorious Insein Prison was hit with two explosions and a shooting on Wednesday morning, according to sources at the site.

At around 9:40am, two parcel bombs went off near the main entrance of the prison: one detonated in a building where staff receive care packages for prisoners and another one went off outside.

An eyewitness told Myanmar Now that a number of civilians were present when the explosions occurred, as they were at the prison to deliver food and other necessities to their incarcerated relatives. 

Following the explosions, gunshots were fired from a prison watchtower—presumably by prison guards or junta troops—causing the people at the location to scatter.  

Three of those killed in the attack were prison staff and five were civilians, said a source within the police force. At least 15 others were injured, the majority of whom were members of the public, he added.

The Insein Prison staff killed in the attack were identified as Kyaw Zin Oo, Khin Moe Wai and Poe Ei Zan. 

Among the civilian casualties was the mother of incarcerated student activist Lin Htet Naing, commonly known as James, who was at the prison to deliver a care package for her son. 

Further information about the remaining victims was not known at the time of the reporting. 

Damage after the explosions at the Insein Prison on October 19 (Supplied)
Damage after the explosions at the Insein Prison on October 19 (Supplied)

The eyewitness claimed that the casualties were not caused by the bomb blasts but by the subsequent shooting from the watchtower.

“I am not sure if the shooters were soldiers or employees at the prison. They opened fire indiscriminately from a watchtower opposite the explosion site. There were around 10 rounds fired, and those hit people, too,” she told Myanmar Now.

She said that she saw five people fall and that they were carried away. Myanmar Now is unable to independently verify her account of the incident. 

All court hearings inside the Insein Prison were subsequently cancelled for the day, according to the relative of a political prisoner who was at the location at the time of the attack. 

No group claimed responsibility for the bombing, and Myanmar’s military council had not issued a statement on the incident at the time of reporting.

Since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020, in-person family visits with prisoners across the country have been suspended. The ban remains in place at the time of reporting, widely seen as a measure imposed by the military to cut off communications between Myanmar’s thousands of political prisoners and the outside world. Those detained on politically motivated charges have only been able to communicate with relatives through the lawyers representing them.

Junta authorities only allow prisoners access to weekly or fortnightly parcel deliveries from family members. This delivery of food and other basic supplies remains critical to the survival of those incarcerated under the military regime.

Myanmar Now News

UN agencies’ Myanmar PR campaign raises more questions than it answers

International aid organisations have not done enough to allay concerns about their deals with the country’s hated regime

Faced with growing criticism over their push to normalise relations with Myanmar’s illegal military junta, United Nations agencies have embarked on an effort to justify their actions. Using social media, they have deployed infographics and other tools to demonstrate just how indispensable international aid organisations are in a country wracked with conflict.

On October 3, for instance, the Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU), which operates under the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), published a map that looks truly impressive. It professes to show areas covered by “projects under implementation” by international nongovernmental organisations (INGOs) and the Red Cross.

In some places, such as Chin and Kayin states, there is barely a speck of white in the sea of yellow that indicates the presence of such projects. Even Sagaing and Magway regions, where the military’s ongoing war against civilians opposed to its rule has been most intense, have about 80% coverage.

Another graphic tweeted by OCHA Myanmar three days later claims that its “partners reached 3.1 million people with assistance at least once in the first half of 2022,” despite “access challenges” and an 80% shortfall in funding for its Humanitarian Response Plan. Again, a strong showing considering Myanmar’s near-total collapse since last year’s military takeover.

A closer look, however, reveals that these figures do not provide an accurate picture of the actual situation on the ground.
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The remains of a house destroyed in an arson attack by regime forces in Sagaing Region's Pale Township in August (Supplied)

The remains of a house destroyed in an arson attack by regime forces in Sagaing Region’s Pale Township in August (Supplied)

Consider this disclaimer from MIMU: “This map shows presence of organisations and does not indicate the volume of assistance, the number of beneficiaries, or the extent to which needs are met or unmet.” In other words, it tells you almost nothing about the real extent of aid delivery.

And then you have to wonder what OCHA Myanmar means when it says that its partners have reached 3.1 million people “at least once” in the first half of this year. This begs the question: How many of these people received aid only once? And was that enough to make a real difference in their lives?

Once you begin to pull on these threads, even more questions come to mind. For example: What kinds of assistance were provided? How was it decided who would receive aid? And what role did the junta play in the decision-making and delivery processes?

In short, it is highly misleading to release facts and figures that do more to obscure than inform. Without context, and without meaningful details, this amounts to little more than a slick PR exercise that does an enormous disservice to ordinary citizens under constant attack from their would-be rulers.

With more than a million people displaced by the military’s “clearance operations” around the country and tens of millions more driven into poverty by the junta’s callous disregard for everything except its own claims to power, Myanmar deserves answers about how international aid is being—and will be—distributed in future.

If UN agencies are genuinely interested in winning the trust of Myanmar’s people, they need to fill in some of the blanks in the information that they have so far provided.
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Hta Naung Taw, a village in Sagaing Region's Monywa Township, is seen after a junta raid on September 29 (Facebook)

Hta Naung Taw, a village in Sagaing Region’s Monywa Township, is seen after a junta raid on September 29 (Facebook)

It is worth asking, for instance, how much international aid has reached parts of Sagaing and Magway regions and Chin, Kayah, and Kayin states devastated by the military’s air and ground assaults. Have UN aid agencies or their partners done needs assessments in these areas? If so, when will they publish this information?

Also, what kind of aid has been provided in these and other parts of the country? And how has it met actual needs?

There are also many who would like to know if the UN has engaged in serious discussions with the National Unity Government, ethnic armed groups, and local civil society organisations on the territories not controlled by junta about what role they could play in delivering aid. If so, have they reached any agreements or allocated any funds?

On the subject of money—have UN agencies and INGOs been exchanging foreign currencies into kyat at the rate set by the regime? Since this would be putting hard currency into the hands of the country’s generals, has any effort been made to assess the impact this would have on their ability to commit crimes against the people of Myanmar?

Is it true, as some have reported, that UN agencies that have signed deals with the regime have pressured their INGO partners to do the same? And have they also agreed to share information about their partners’ projects with the junta?

Given that the UN’s Humanitarian Response Plan for Myanmar is operating on only 20% of its budget for this year, it seems pertinent to ask how much of this money has been spent on UN personnel and INGO expat staff who have been outside of the country since the coup. Are they receiving extra compensation, in the form of lodging costs, per diems, family allowances, and so on, in addition to their regular salaries? If so, are these expenses being paid for from the $169m that the UN says it has at its disposal to assist Myanmar’s most vulnerable citizens?

What assurances can the UN offer that the junta won’t be able to weaponise aid, by directing it into areas under its control while denying it to those living in parts of the country where it faces resistance? And considering the dramatic spike in corruption since the coup, are there any guarantees that money meant to assist the poor won’t end up being misdirected towards those who don’t need it at all?
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Residents of several villages in Sagaing Region flee after a junta raid on September 20 (Supplied)

Residents of several villages in Sagaing Region flee after a junta raid on September 20 (Supplied)

These are just some of the many questions that could be asked. But I leave it to a colleague with more than 20 years experience as a Myanmar national working in the aid sector to ask the one that should matter most to UN agencies seeking to return to business as usual in her country.

“Do you know,” she said, addressing “international colleagues” who might not want to hear what she has to say, “that in the eyes of the general public and most civil society organisations, anyone who deals with this illegitimate regime is seen as an accomplice in its many human rights abuses, including its killing of innocent children?”

The UN agencies clearly care enough about their image to make some attempt to justify their decision to cooperate with a regime that most in the country openly reject (even at great risk to their own lives). But if they believe that graphs and maps with incomplete data will be enough to convince anyone that they are a force for good, they are seriously mistaken.

Igor Blazevic is a prominent human rights campaigner based in the Czech Republic. He is a lecturer at Educational Initiatives, a training program for Myanmar activists, and a senior adviser with the Prague Civil Society Centre.

Myanmar Now News

Chin woman and girl knifed to death in Magway township with heavy military presence

The two victims disappeared last week while on their way home from a nearby village; their bodies were discovered on Sunday

A young woman and a 14-year-old girl were found murdered in southwestern Magway Region’s Ngape Township on Sunday, four days after they went missing in the heavily militarised area.

The two victims, who were both members of the Asho Chin ethnic group, were last seen alive in the village of Goke Gyi, where they had met relatives on Thursday.

They were walking back to their home village of Bone Maw, some 1.2km away, later that day when they disappeared, local sources reported.

The bodies of 21-year-old kindergarten teacher Mai Shwesin Ye and eighth-grader Mai Naung Pa Hla were discovered near Myay Latt, another village in the same area, on Sunday, the sources said.

“There were so many stab wounds—in their thighs, backs, necks, breasts, and stomachs. It was just so cruel,” said one person close to the victims’ families who saw the bodies.

It was believed that the older victim had also been raped.

“The older girl was wearing a dress but her body didn’t have any underwear on. The younger girl was wearing a pair of jeans and had been tied up with ropes,” said the source.

The murders were reported at the village police station in Goke Gyi, but as of Tuesday, no information had been released regarding an investigation.

The bodies of the victims were cremated in the nearby town of Padein on Monday and their remains were interred at the cemetery in Bone Maw the next morning, the family friend told Myanmar Now.

According to local news outlets, the military maintains a base in Goke Gyi as part of its efforts to eradicate opium poppies in the nearby hills.

Soldiers stationed in the village were said to be from Light Infantry Division 88, based in Padein. Since last year’s coup, an additional 100 troops have been sent there as reinforcements, the news outlets reported.

There is also another base in the area set up to guard a pipeline that runs from the Rakhine coast to China, according to locals, who say that the base is usually manned by six soldiers and four police. 

Ngape Township, which borders Rakhine State, also has two weapons factories and several other military installations. 

Despite being in Magway Region, which has been one of the main areas of resistance activities since the military seized power in February of last year, Ngape Township has seen relatively little fighting due to the proximity of the pipeline and geographical conditions, locals said.

Myanmar Now News