Lives in the Absence of Safety

The Ta’ang Women’s Organization (TWO) has released a report titled ‘Lives in the Absence of Safety.’
This field report documents human rights violations committed by the “terror” military council in northern Shan State from February 1, 2021, to 2024, following the coup d’état.

The report highlights severe human rights abuses, the situation in the Ta’ang region before and after the coup, and the overall deterioration of social conditions.
It also covers the airstrikes targeting civilians during Operation 1027, the dire living conditions of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the status of rehabilitation assistance.
Furthermore, it presents findings on the regional situation under the administration of revolutionary organizations.

Screenshot

Ira­nian shadow fleet fuels Myan­mar junta’s expand­ing air cam­paign against civil­ians

LONDON (Reu­ters) – The first bomb to strike the remote west­ern Myan­mar vil­lage of Vanha came from a junta war­plane. It hit the only school in the ham­let, near the front­line of Myan­mar’s civil war. The second came from a drone minutes later.

On that day, Octo­ber 13, 2025, an Ira­nian tanker was headed home from Myan­mar, where it had recently unloaded more than 16,000 tons of jet fuel under a cloak of elec­tronic scram­bling – enough for thou­sands more fighter jet sorties.

Illi­cit Ira­nian deliv­er­ies of jet fuel have powered an expans­ive bomb­ing cam­paign by the Myan­mar junta that has struck more than 1,000 civil­ian loc­a­tions in 15 months, a Reu­ters invest­ig­a­tion has found. Iran has also dis­patched car­goes of urea, a key ingredi­ent in the junta’s muni­tions, includ­ing the bombs it drops from drones and paragliders.

Taken together, the Ira­nian deliv­er­ies to Myan­mar’s mil­it­ary have helped shift the dynamic of the five-year civil war, which pits the junta against an array of rebel groups, none of which have a con­ven­tional air force or a ready sup­ply of weapons as power­ful as the bombs and mis­siles launched by fighter jets. And for Iran’s embattled gov­ern­ment, the trade has brought in new rev­enue and influ­ence, as sanc­tions tighten and old allies lose power.

By the time the war­plane swooped over Vanha and bombed the school, Myan­mar’s air force had already received huge quant­it­ies of Ira­nian jet fuel. Two stu­dents died that day and 22 people were wounded, accord­ing to one of the wounded, a man who was in the school­yard, and Chin Human Rights Organ­iz­a­tion, which doc­u­ments junta attacks in the region.

Most of the chil­dren were out­side clean­ing up the yard at the time, the wounded man said, or the toll would have been far worse. Vanha’s dead were among at least 1,728 civil­ians killed in gov­ern­ment air­strikes since the Ira­nian deliv­er­ies began, accord­ing to data com­piled by Burma News Inter­na­tional-Myan­mar Peace Mon­itor, which tracks the con­flict.

From Octo­ber 2024 to Decem­ber 2025, Iran delivered a total of about 175,000 tons of jet fuel to the junta in nine ship­ments from Reef and a lar­ger sis­ter ship, Noble, accord­ing to ship­ping doc­u­ments reviewed by Reu­ters, and satel­lite imagery and ana­lysis by the US firm Syn­Max Intel­li­gence.

The doc­u­ments and other ship­ping data show the two ships sail­ing out of Iran have been Myan­mar’s primary sup­pli­ers of jet fuel since the deliv­er­ies began. The surge in Ira­nian imports also includes hun­dreds of thou­sands of tons of urea. The pet­ro­chem­ical product is typ­ic­ally a fer­til­izer ingredi­ent, but Myan­mar’s junta also uses it in muni­tions, accord­ing to two sol­diers who defec­ted from the mil­it­ary.

Although the intensi­fy­ing air cam­paign has been widely doc­u­mented, Iran’s cent­ral role in fuel­ing it and sup­ply­ing urea has not been pre­vi­ously repor­ted.

The deliv­er­ies, which are cir­cum­vent­ing West­ern sanc­tions on both Iran and Myan­mar, are a badly needed crutch for their troubled repress­ive gov­ern­ments.

The United Nations Spe­cial Rap­por­teur on Human Rights in Myan­mar, respond­ing to find­ings about the Ira­nian ship­ments to Myan­mar, called for the Ira­nian gov­ern­ment to be held account­able for the actions of its new cus­tomer.

“This fuel that is being shipped in from Iran is lit­er­ally fuel­ing mass atro­cit­ies,” Tom Andrews said. “There has been an escal­a­tion in attacks on civil­ian tar­gets. It’s just hor­rific and unac­cept­able. It’s import­ant to point out those that are enabling it.”

Iran’s UN mis­sion declined to com­ment, and Myan­mar’s gov­ern­ment did not respond. Report­ers were unable to reach the own­ers of Reef and Noble; an email lis­ted as a con­tact was not valid.

IRAN’S THEOCRACY, reel­ing from US and Israeli mil­it­ary attacks and the col­lapse of its cur­rency, has just crushed anti-gov­ern­ment protests that posed one of the greatest threats to the Islamic Repub­lic since 1979. It is des­per­ate for money, after years of sanc­tions.

Myan­mar’s mil­it­ary dic­tat­or­ship is also try­ing to quell a rebel­lion that erup­ted after the junta staged a coup in 2021. The fuel has helped at a crit­ical moment. Its 100 or so war­planes, includ­ing Chinese-designed JF-17s, Rus­sian MiG-29s and Suk­hoi-30s, are fly­ing far more bomb­ing raids since the fuel trade boomed. Myan­mar’s rebels are increas­ingly strug­gling to keep con­trol of ter­rit­ory in the face of the junta’s dom­in­ance of the skies.

Reef and Noble, both sanc­tioned by the United States in 2024, star­ted mak­ing the roughly 5,500-kilo­meter voy­ages from Iran to Myan­mar in Octo­ber of that year, falsi­fy­ing their jour­neys using a tech­nique called spoof­ing that is com­mon among cargo ships and tankers mak­ing illi­cit deliv­er­ies.

Since that first deliv­ery until Decem­ber 31, Myan­mar’s mil­it­ary car­ried out 1,022 air­strikes on civil­ian tar­gets, more than double the num­ber from the pre­vi­ous 15-month period, accord­ing to Myan­mar Peace Mon­itor data. Reu­ters has not been able to inde­pend­ently con­firm the num­ber of air­strikes or civil­ian cas­u­al­ties.

Vanha’s approx­im­ately 260 res­id­ents live within a roughly 500-meter radius of the school, and when the air­strike hit, the shock wave rippled through their homes. Video veri­fied by Reu­ters shows people flee­ing when the second explo­sion rings out from the drone.

The vil­lage, ringed by for­es­ted moun­tains, is in Chin state, an impov­er­ished west­ern province bor­der­ing India, where the junta is attempt­ing to claw back ter­rit­ory from rebels. Before the year was done, mil­it­ary jets bombed two other schools within 70 kilo­met­ers of Vanha, accord­ing to the Chin Human Rights Organ­iz­a­tion.

Most of Vanha’s vil­la­gers are now so scared of another air­strike that they sleep in the sur­round­ing jungle and emerge from the tree can­opy to return home only when neces­sary, said the man wounded that day. “Why are they attack­ing inno­cent civil­ians and young chil­dren?” he asked.

Reu­ters could not con­firm whether the war­plane that struck Vanha was fly­ing on Ira­nian jet fuel. However, it had been more than a year since the fuel had come from any­where else, the doc­u­ments and ship­ping data show.

The move­ment of the Ira­nian ships was tracked using satel­lite images and ana­lysis provided by Syn­Max. The data cor­rob­or­ated details lis­ted in the ship­ping doc­u­ments, which con­tained the ves­sels’ names, cargo, port calls, and arrival and depar­ture dates.

People and com­pan­ies con­nec­ted to the ter­minal where Reef and Noble off-loaded their liquid cargo, near Myan­mar’s com­mer­cial cap­ital of Yan­gon, have been sanc­tioned by the United States, Canada, the European Union, and Bri­tain for sup­ply­ing jet fuel to the mil­it­ary.

An ana­lyst who tracks Ira­nian ship­ping also con­firmed some jet fuel deliv­er­ies. Some of Reef’s and Noble’s vis­its to the ter­minal were fur­ther con­firmed by Myan­mar Wit­ness, a project of the Cen­ter for Inform­a­tion Resi­li­ence, an organ­iz­a­tion focused on expos­ing human rights viol­a­tions.

Pub­licly avail­able ship-track­ing data and Myan­mar Port Author­ity records also con­firmed addi­tional inform­a­tion in the doc­u­ments, includ­ing the deliv­er­ies of urea.

Iran’s export surge to Myan­mar fol­lows a series of pun­it­ive West­ern export bans on mater­i­als that could be used by the junta to repress civil­ians. Those eco­nomic sanc­tions raised the risks for com­mer­cial fuel sup­pli­ers and dis­trib­ut­ors to sell to Myan­mar, prompt­ing most to exit the coun­try.

In a response to ques­tions about Iran’s role in sup­ply­ing Myan­mar’s mil­it­ary, the US Treas­ury Depart­ment said Iran’s quest for new mar­kets was a sign that the Trump admin­is­tra­tion’s eco­nomic pres­sure had been suc­cess­ful. “The regime’s oil profits are being choked,” an offi­cial said.

The for­eign affairs offices of the EU and Canada declined to com­ment. Bri­tain’s For­eign Office noted that it had more than 550 sanc­tions imposed on Iran over its nuc­lear pro­gram and human rights viol­a­tions, includ­ing the Islamic Revolu­tion­ary Guard Corps (IRGC) and 25 indi­vidu­als and 39 entit­ies in Myan­mar since the coup.

“The UK con­demns human rights viol­a­tions by the Myan­mar mil­it­ary, includ­ing air­strikes on civil­ian infra­struc­ture,” the For­eign Office spokes­man said.

Iran has a long his­tory of mil­it­ary sup­port for allies, includ­ing Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Hezbol­lah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and former pres­id­ent Nic­olas Maduro in Venezuela. The sales to Myan­mar are part of a broader strategy of extend­ing its influ­ence by deep­en­ing ties with other isol­ated gov­ern­ments – espe­cially after the fall of older allies since the end of 2024, accord­ing to ana­lysts. Assad and Maduro are now out of power, and Hezbol­lah and Hamas are strug­gling to recover from mil­it­ary defeats by Israel.

The sales also replen­ish state cof­fers depleted by the sanc­tions and Iran’s con­flict with Israel. Jet fuel com­mands a 33% premium com­pared to Brent crude, mean­ing Iran could have earned about $123 mil­lion for those nine ship­ments of jet fuel at cur­rent mar­ket prices, accord­ing to estim­ates based on Inter­na­tional Air Trans­port Asso­ci­ation data.

ON SEPTEMBER 15, 2025, Reef’s loc­a­tion trans­mit­ter pinged off the south­ern coast of Iraq near the Bas­rah Oil Ter­minal.

Satel­lite imagery of the area at the time, however, shows no sign of the ves­sel. Reef was actu­ally at the Ira­nian port of Bandar Abbas, load­ing fuel 8 kilo­met­ers away from a refinery that pro­duces jet fuel and is over­seen by the National Ira­nian Oil Refin­ing and Dis­tri­bu­tion Com­pany, known as NIORDC, Syn­Max satel­lite imagery shows.

At times, dur­ing load­ing, Reef’s cover slipped and the loc­a­tion trans­mit­ter gave away its accur­ate pos­i­tion, before revert­ing to the fake loc­a­tion, Syn­Max data show.

US and EU sanc­tions doc­u­ments show NIORDC is a sub­si­di­ary of the National Ira­nian Oil Com­pany, which con­trols Iran’s pet­ro­leum exports and gen­er­ates huge amounts of money for the IRGC.

The US Office of For­eign Assets Con­trol, the arm of the Treas­ury Depart­ment in charge of sanc­tions, iden­ti­fied the National Ira­nian Oil Com­pany as an “agent or affil­i­ate” of the IRGC in 2012.

Reef is part of Iran’s shadow fleet – a net­work of ves­sels used to secretly trans­port illi­cit cargo. The Ira­nian fleet ships $50 bil­lion worth of oil each year to cus­tom­ers abroad, by far its largest source of for­eign cur­rency and its prin­cipal con­nec­tion to the global eco­nomy, Reu­ters repor­ted in 2024.

The IRGC, with con­trol over both the coun­try’s illi­cit eco­nomy and its internal secur­ity, dom­in­ates the fuel-smug­gling net­works and other busi­ness interests that have been a life­line for Iran’s elite. But the organ­iz­a­tion has pro­voked pop­u­lar back­lash with its viol­ent sup­pres­sion of dis­sent, cor­rup­tion and strangle­hold over the eco­nomy, accord­ing to ana­lysts and sanc­tions experts.

Reef and Noble and their owner, Sea Route Ship Man­age­ment FZE, were sanc­tioned by the US in 2024 for “know­ingly” trans­port­ing Ira­nian pet­ro­chem­ical products. Reef has changed its name and flag of regis­tra­tion three times in as many years – a com­mon tac­tic in the shadow fleet.

Reef and Noble docked at the Myan Oil Ter­minal, a facil­ity on the out­skirts of Yan­gon pre­vi­ously known as Puma, Syn­Max imagery showed. In an archived web­site, a former cor­por­ate owner said it handled 100% of Myan­mar’s mar­ket for jet fuel, which spoils eas­ily and requires spe­cial­ized stor­age and trans­port.

West­ern gov­ern­ments have des­ig­nated the net­work of com­pan­ies con­nec­ted to the facil­ity – includ­ing Myan Oil, Swan Energy, Shoon Energy, and Asia Sun Group – as key part­ners of the junta in import­ing, stor­ing, and dis­trib­ut­ing jet fuel. Those firms and two asso­ci­ated indi­vidu­als, Zaw Min Tun and Win Kyaw Kyaw Aung, were sanc­tioned for sup­ply­ing the fuel to the mil­it­ary.

Neither Myan Oil nor the net­work of com­pan­ies and people con­nec­ted to the ter­minal respon­ded to requests for com­ment. In many cases, email addresses for them that were lis­ted in the sanc­tions notices were invalid.

THE SHIFT toward Ira­nian sup­plies under­scores a broader realign­ment in rela­tions between Iran and Myan­mar’s mil­it­ary, known as the Tatmadaw.

In 2017, Ira­nian pres­id­ent Has­san Rouh­ani strongly cri­ti­cized the Tatmadaw, after it mas­sacred thou­sands of Rohingya, a mainly Muslim minor­ity. As waves of Rohingya civil­ians fled to Bangladesh fol­low­ing the mil­it­ary offens­ive, Rouh­ani’s admin­is­tra­tion urged Islamic nations to help end the crisis.

“The inter­na­tional com­munity has no excuse to allow the gen­o­cide of Rohingya Muslims to con­tinue in front of our eyes,” Ira­nian for­eign min­is­ter Mohammad Javad Zarif said that Septem­ber.

But after the Tatmadaw ous­ted the civil­ian gov­ern­ment led by Nobel Peace Prize win­ner Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021, there was a rap­proche­ment. In Janu­ary 2022, an Ira­nian gov­ern­ment del­eg­a­tion secretly vis­ited Myan­mar to meet with mem­bers of the mil­it­ary, accord­ing to a regional secur­ity source who closely tracks the junta. The visit was first repor­ted by Asia Times.

They were there to sell Ira­nian weapons, includ­ing guided mis­siles and other mil­it­ary equip­ment, said the secur­ity source, who spoke on con­di­tion of anonym­ity. The source described the visit as a sign that Iran had decided in favor of mil­it­ary sup­port for the junta, while also expand­ing its arms-export mar­ket.

“When push comes to shove, they can make the neces­sary adjust­ments,” said Danny Cit­rinow­icz, a former Israeli intel­li­gence officer and now senior Iran researcher at the Insti­tute for National Secur­ity Stud­ies think tank, refer­ring to Iran’s pivot to Myan­mar. “You can flex the ideo­logy where it’s a stra­tegic interest. And def­in­itely Myan­mar is a coun­try that’s inter­est­ing to them.”

In addi­tion to increas­ing jet fuel deliv­er­ies, Iran has over the past three years become a primary source of Myan­mar’s urea, which the junta has used to man­u­fac­ture explos­ives. Three trade ana­lysts who track the imports closely said Iran’s sup­plies have increased drastic­ally. The annual volume of such Ira­nian imports into Myan­mar could be in the range of 400,000 and 600,000 tons, accord­ing to two of them.

At least two ves­sels that trans­port bulk car­goes, Golden ES and Rasha, delivered urea from Iran to Myan­mar last year, port author­ity data and satel­lite imagery show. As with Reef and Noble, Golden ES and Rasha manip­u­lated their onboard loc­a­tion trans­mit­ters to dis­guise their depar­ture point, accord­ing to Syn­Max. The quant­it­ies of urea described by the ana­lysts would entail mul­tiple deliv­er­ies, but Reu­ters was unable to con­firm other ship­ments.

The own­ers of Golden ES and Rasha did not respond to requests for com­ment.

Major Naung Yoe, a sol­dier who said he defec­ted from the mil­it­ary in 2021 to avoid killing civil­ians and joined the rebel­lion, said urea ends up in two ord­nance factor­ies in cent­ral Myan­mar, where it can be integ­rated into mul­tiple kinds of explos­ives, includ­ing bombs dropped from drones and paragliders. Another defec­ted sol­dier con­firmed the urea-based muni­tions.

Deep­en­ing com­mer­cial ties have been accom­pan­ied by recent high-level polit­ical engage­ment between Myan­mar and Iran.

In Decem­ber 2025, Ira­nian Pres­id­ent Masoud Pezeshkian sat across from Myan­mar’s Prime Min­is­ter Nyo Saw on the side­lines of a sum­mit in Turk­menistan. An Ira­nian readout of the meet­ing said Nyo Saw emphas­ized the desire to expand cooper­a­tion in oil imports and extrac­tion tech­no­logy.

Iran was also invited to send mon­it­ors to observe Myan­mar’s phased gen­eral elec­tion that star­ted on Decem­ber 28, 2025. It was a vote that the oppos­i­tion, the UN, and many inter­na­tional observ­ers described as neither free nor fair. Myan­mar’s junta has said the elec­tion was suc­cess­ful and broadly pop­u­lar.

AS THE elec­tion approached, the Tatmadaw con­tin­ued its aer­ial bom­bard­ment of civil­ian areas.

Wai Hun Aung, an aid worker, was at home late on Decem­ber 10 when he heard a plane fly­ing over­head. Moments later, a massive explo­sion shook his house in Mrauk-U town in Rakhine state, a coastal province bor­der­ing Bangladesh where the mil­it­ary has been locked in fierce fight­ing with the Arakan Army rebel group.

“I was ter­ri­fied. I knew instantly that we were being tar­geted by an air­strike,” Wai Hun Aung said.

It was not until dawn, when he reached the town’s main hos­pital on his motor­bike, that the aid worker grasped the scale of destruc­tion.

Rel­at­ives of patients swarmed the wreck­age of the hos­pital, look­ing for sur­viv­ors, he said. At least 30 people were killed and more than 70 wounded, accord­ing to Reu­ters report­ing. It was among the dead­li­est aer­ial attacks of the civil war.

Only days earlier, Reef had made another cov­ert deliv­ery to Myan­mar, unload­ing nearly 15,000 met­ric tons of jet fuel, accord­ing to the doc­u­ments and satel­lite images. As on pre­vi­ous trips, the crew spoofed its loc­a­tion to falsely show it was sail­ing from Iraq’s Bas­rah Oil Ter­minal to Chit­tagong in Bangladesh.

A port author­ity offi­cial in Chit­tagong said he wasn’t aware of the spoof­ing oper­a­tion. Iraq’s gov­ern­ment did not respond to requests for com­ment.

Pick­ing his way through the rubble that morn­ing, Wai Hun Aung said he found bod­ies and severed limbs scattered across what had been wards and oper­at­ing theat­ers in a 300-bed hos­pital.

“It felt like the end of the world,” he said in a series of audio mes­sages, “the sound of cry­ing from out­side and the sight of the bod­ies inside.”

The hos­pital in Mrauk-U lies in ruins, but the tankers that enabled the destruc­tion keep mov­ing. In late Janu­ary, as the Ira­nian protests were crushed, Syn­Max data showed Noble again pre­tend­ing to be anchored off the south­ern tip of Iraq. In real­ity, the ship was loiter­ing near the Ira­nian port of Bandar Abbas, wait­ing to set sail. was loaded and on its way back toward Yan­gon.

The Jerusalem Post

With international law at a ‘breaking point’, a tiny country goes after Myanmar’s junta on its own

Just four months ago, Timor-Leste formally became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN).

This week, the tiny country took an unprecedented step: its judicial authorities appointed a prosecutor to examine the Myanmar military’s responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity. It’s believed to be the first time an ASEAN state has taken such an action against another member.

The case resulted from the persistence of a victims’ group, the Chin Human Rights Organisation, in pursuing justice for the Chin people, a minority group in Myanmar. In submitting the complaint, the head of the organisation expressed solidarity with Timor-Leste’s own historic efforts to secure justice and independence.

Timor-Leste authorities will now assess whether to bring charges against Myanmar’s military leaders, including junta chief Min Aung Hlaing.

Any prosecutions would be on the basis of “universal jurisdiction”. This is a legal principle that allows domestic courts to hear cases alleging international crimes, regardless of where the crimes occurred, or the nationality of the victims or perpetrators.

Limitations of international courts

This week, a major study of 23 conflicts around the globe said the international legal system designed to protect civilians is at a “breaking point”. Observers are also asking whether the United Nations has any future at all.

Transparent, research-based, written by experts – and always free.

About us

It has long been clear that international courts have limited efficacy in prosecuting cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Critics argue the International Criminal Court (ICC) has engaged in selective prosecutions, is too slow and has weak enforcement powers. In the past 20 years, the court has heard 34 cases and issued just 13 convictions.

However, proponents of the court say it has been unfairly maligned and targeted, including by the Trump administration, which imposed sanctions on it last year.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), meanwhile, can hold states accountable for crimes, but not individuals.

Both the ICC and ICJ have investigations underway on Myanmar, but they deal with crimes allegedly committed against the Rohingya minority group before the coup. The ICC case covers incidents committed partly in Bangladesh.

The ICC’s chief prosecutor asked the court’s judges to issue an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlang in November 2024. More than a year later, a decision has yet to be made.

Challenges for domestic courts

In this environment, universal jurisdiction could play a more important role. The United Nations has implicitly recognised this by establishing investigative mechanisms for Syria and Myanmar that gather evidence for future prosecutions in domestic, regional or international courts.

Many states have laws that allow them to prosecute international crimes like torture, genocide or war crimes. What is lacking are resources to fund investigations and transparent criteria or guidelines for how to undertake them.

There are other challenges once cases are underway, too. For one, domestic courts have limited reach. Arrests are difficult, as high-level officials can rely on diplomatic immunity or just avoid the countries where they believe they could face prosecution or extradition.

Prosecuting even lower-level or mid-level perpetrators can be politically awkward. Cases can be expensive and practically difficult, especially when witnesses and evidence are mostly overseas.

The scale and complex nature of these crimes can also be challenging for domestic criminal courts that have limited experience with them.

And if trials go ahead, victims can still find justice elusive, even if the cases have broader strategic or symbolic aims.

Still, there have been successes. Nearly 10 years ago, the former president of Chad, Hissène Habré, was convicted of international crimes in Senegal. The case was tried using universal jurisdiction, driven by civil society networks.

More countries need to step up

This latest initiative in Timor-Leste comes after victim groups have tried many different countries to seek justice for the people of Myanmar. This includes Argentina, where arrest warrants were issued for Myanmar’s leadersTurkey, and Germany.

In the Asia-Pacific, lawyers have also attempted to bring cases in Indonesia and the Philippines.

While European countries are increasingly using universal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes, other countries have been less keen to take these cases on. For instance, some suggest Canada and Australia could do more to investigate war crimes cases, even though they both have the laws in place to do so.

This just leaves the heavy lifting of prosecutions to others, possibly in courts with more limited resources.

With atrocities continuing to be committed around the world, it’s become more vital than ever for governments to not just back international justice with strong words, but show a real commitment to investigating them at home.

Source : theconversation

The Situation of Transitional Justice in Myanmar (2017–2025)

From 2017 until the end of 2025, developments in Burma/Myanmar related to Transitional Justice (TJ)—within the framework of Truth, Justice, Reparations, and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence—have been studied and documented in chronological order.
The Human Rights Network Documentation – Burma (ND-Burma) has compiled and published this report to the best of its capacity.

Survivors of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity Bring a Case Against the Myanmar Junta in Timor-Leste

By Chin Human Rights Organisation and Myanmar Accountability Project

Dili, 13 January 2026: A group representing survivors of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by the Myanmar junta have presented a criminal complaint to the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Timor-Leste, requesting the opening of an investigation.

According to the head of the delegation, Salai Za Uk, Executive Director of the Chin Human Rights Organisation (CHRO), the criminal file includes “evidence of the gang rape of a pregnant woman; the massacre of ten people, including a journalist and a 13-year-old boy, who was among eight people who had their throats slit; the deliberate killing of one Christian Pastor and three Deacons; a disproportionate and indiscriminate aerial attack on a hospital which killed four medical staff and four patients, and a series of attacks on Christian churches”.

Accountability for these crimes is permissible in Timor-Leste under the principle of universal jurisdiction, which allows state authorities to take action regardless of where the crimes took place or the nationality of the victims and perpetrators.

Jose Teixeira, who together with his colleague Nuno Marrazes are the lead lawyers in the case, from the Timorese law firm Da Silva Teixeira & Associados Lda, said “the case will place minimal pressure on Timor-Leste’s judicial system. All the evidence we presented has been meticulously documented and reconfirmed by CHRO. In addition, the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) established by the UN, has a large body of verified evidence which can be made available to the Timorese authorities as part of their investigation”.

The crimes in the Timor-Leste complaint were committed in Myanmar’s predominantly Christian Chin State, which according to Salai Za Uk has seen “a deliberate, systematic, widespread, disproportionate and indiscriminate campaign of violence against civilians”.

Since July 2022, the military junta had carried out around 1,000 documented air strikes in the state. More than 4,600 homes have been destroyed by airstrikes or deliberately burnt down. 478 civilians have been killed, including 91 women and 79 children. At least 19 medical facilities, 25 schools and 127 religious buildings, including 78 churches, have been damaged or destroyed, according to CHRO figures.

The situation in Chin State is reflected across the country. According to the latest data from the UN and other credible sources, as of 31 March 2025, at least 6,473 civilians were killed by junta forces, including 1,487 women and 748 children. Over 30,000 have been detained and over 22,000 remain in detention. Nearly 2,000 people have died in military detention, with well documented cases of dozens being tortured to death. 172 people have been sentenced to death by military-controlled courts.

The UN estimates that violence in Myanmar has displaced more than 3.5 million people – over 5 per cent of the population – and although nearly 20 million are in need of assistance, according to the UN, the military has consistently blocked humanitarian access, even after natural disasters, including the earthquake in March 2025. Best estimates indicate that more than 1.5 million Myanmar people have crossed international borders by land or sea in search of safety, through regular and irregular channels, which has created a regional refugee crisis with dire human rights and humanitarian challenges.

The complainants hope that the case will resonate powerfully with the Timorese people, given Myanmar and Timor-Leste’s similar modern histories. Like Timor-Leste, says Salai Za Uk, “Myanmar was ruled for generations by Western colonials and, like Timor-Leste, Myanmar’s post-independence period saw vicious atrocity crimes perpetrated against innocent people. Since the coup there have been numerous attacks by the Myanmar junta on unarmed demonstrators in which thousands have been killed. They bring to mind the infamous Santa Cruz Massacre in Dili in 1991 in which over 250 demonstrators were murdered in cold blood”.

The Timor-Leste case is supported by the Myanmar Accountability Project, whose director, Chris Gunness, argues that “if the authorities in Timor-Leste took the simple step of opening an investigation it would send a powerful message, widely accepted across the ASEAN, that the situation in Myanmar is unsustainable and must change. The legal case in Dili offers an opportunity for solidarity with some of the most marginalized and isolated people in the ASEAN region”.

Salai Za Uk appealed for support to Timorese civil society, the Catholic Church and all Timorese people of conscience. “Given the position on human rights and accountability taken by leading politicians and other influential voices in Timor-Leste, the Chin People earnestly believe that our call for accountability will be heard. And we fervently hope that as Christians, our prayers for justice, peace and dignity, on behalf of the people of Myanmar, will be answered”.

*****

For further information and interview requests in Tetum, Bahasa Indonesia, Chin, Portuguese or English, please contact:

Jose Teixeira/Manuel Sa Martins/Sahe da Silva on +670 77287080 or jose.teixeira@dasilva.tl

Salai Za Uk on +91 8798837474 or zauk@chinhumanrights.org

Chris Gunness on +44 7587 698990 or cgunness@outlook.com

Seeking Justice and Solidarity in Dili

Today, January 14, 2026, a delegation from the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO), led by Executive Director Salai Za Uk, held a significant one-hour meeting with President José Ramos-Horta at the Presidential Palace in Dili.

The delegation provided a comprehensive briefing on the escalating “reign of terror” in Myanmar’s Chin State and across the country. Key highlights from the meeting included:

• Evidence of Atrocities: Briefing the President on the systematic targeting of civilians, including aerial attacks on hospitals, schools, and churches.

• Legal Accountability: Discussing the case filed in Dili against ten members of the Myanmar military for crimes including the massacre of civilians and the targeted killing of religious leaders.

• A Shared History: Reflecting on the “bond of kinship” between Timor-Leste and Myanmar, born from a shared history of struggle and a mutual quest for nationhood.

We are deeply grateful to President Ramos-Horta for his time and his meaningful engagement. In a place that has known its own struggle for justice, we find hope that the cries of the Myanmar people will finally be heard.

“Though we were denied justice in our own country, we seek a sense of restitution here.” — Salai Za Uk