Releases‘Defying a Dictatorship’: An Overview of the Human Rights Situation in Burma

The Network for Human Rights Documentation – Burma Releases
‘Defying a Dictatorship’: An Overview of the Human Rights Situation in Burma
July-December 2025

17 March 2026

For Immediate Release

Today, the Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma publishes its latest bi-annual report, ‘Defying a Dictatorship,’ which outlines the human rights situation in various States and Regions of ND-Burma members from July to December 2025.

During this period, ND-Burma’s member organizations documented 462 human rights violations across 279 incidents in seven regions and six states in Burma. Of these, 271 violations were committed by the military junta, 5 by Ethnic Revolution Organizations (EROs), and 3 cases could not be attributed to a perpetrator.  In total, 881 individuals, including 357 males, 187 females, 182 children, and 155 individuals of unknown gender or age, had their rights violated. Significantly, 352 individuals, including 173 males, 80 females, 82 children, and 17 of unknown genders or ages, were killed.

The situation on the ground for civilians remains increasingly volatile as the armed actors continue to evade accountability for their widespread and systematic crimes. The most vulnerable, especially women and children, are forced to endure the worst suffering as their calls to the international community for action go largely unanswered. With over 3.5 million people displaced nationwide, the urgency for action is clear. It is vital that global stakeholders are not deceived by the regime’s insistence that the situation is normal. Quite the contrary. Humanitarian aid and elections are routinely weaponized as tools to control and surveil the population.

Furthermore, as shown in the latest report by ND-Burma, there are numerous cases in areas where members are actively documenting human rights violations, providing evidence of how the junta is terrorizing innocent people. A rule of law or a federal democracy cannot exist with the junta in any leadership role. Therefore, the international community must respond to the longstanding calls of civil society by pursuing coordinated and meaningful actions that hold the regime accountable at the highest levels, including referring the human rights situation in Burma to the International Criminal Court. The survival and future of a new Burma depend on it.

For more information:

Name: Nai Aue Mon

Signal: +66 86 1679 741

Name: San Htoi

Signal: +66 64 9369 070

Defying a Dictatorship

Defying a Dictatorship

An Overview of the Human Rights Situation in Burma: July-December 2025

The Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma (ND-Burma) is deeply grateful to the interviewees for their courage in speaking out against the violations committed against them. We also appreciate our member organizations and fieldworkers, who continue to gather invaluable testimonies at their own personal risk. This report would not be possible without the work and contributions of ND-Burma members, the bravery of victims, and their coordinated efforts to collect evidence of human rights abuses despite the threats to their safety and security. 

The voices of civilians in this report remind us that there is still a long way to go for peace in Burma. We are motivated by their resilience to continue in the face of abject human rights abuses and crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Burmese Army and its various militias and accomplices on the ground. We sincerely thank our supporters and institutions offering unwavering support in making this report possible.

Report briefer link for Eng

Open Letter: The UNHRC Must Reject the Junta’s Sham Election Results to ConsolidateIllegitimate Rule and Advance Accountability

To: Member and Observer States of the UN Human Rights Council
CC: UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar
18 February 2026
Open Letter: The UNHRC Must Reject the Junta’s Sham Election Results to Consolidate
Illegitimate Rule and Advance Accountability
Excellencies,
We, the undersigned 235 Myanmar, regional, and international civil society organizations, urge
the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to take decisive, principled, concrete and
time-bound action to protect the rights and dignity of the people of Myanmar. As the Council
considers its 2026 resolution on Myanmar, we call for the adoption of a robust resolution that:

  1. Responds effectively to the escalating human rights and humanitarian catastrophe;
  2. Unequivocally rejects the military junta’s attempts to seize legitimacy through a sham
    electoral process conducted under the military-drafted 2008 Constitution and refuses
    recognition of any outcomes or governance structures arising from it;
  3. Impedes the junta’s capacity to carry out airstrikes and other atrocity crimes, including
    through measures that restrict access to aviation fuel, arms, and dual-use technologies;
  4. Addresses transnational organized crimes and the criminal economies (or illicit financial
    networks) that enable the junta to continue its terror campaign; and
  5. Advances accountability through all available international legal avenues.

    Excellencies,
    The Myanmar crisis is the direct consequence of the military’s attempted coup in February 2021
    and its subsequent campaign of systematic violence to unlawfully seize and consolidate power
    against the will of the people. Since then, the military junta has deliberately applied terror and
    repression with total impunity.
    Over the past five years, the Myanmar military junta has waged a sustained campaign of terror
    attacks against civilians, marked by widespread and systematic violations of international human
    rights and humanitarian law. These abuses include indiscriminate airstrikes and shelling,
    massacres, extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, torture, conflict-related sexual
    violence, and mass arbitrary arrest and detention. Since February 2021, at least 30,476 political
    prisoners have been arrested, 22,780 of whom remain detained, while 7,804 people have been
    killed. Documentation records at least 501 massacres, resulting in thousands of civilian deaths.


    Hundreds of thousands of civilian homes and public buildings have been deliberately destroyed,
    often through coordinated arson and airstrikes, especially in Sagaing, Magway and Tanintharyi
    Regions and Chin, Karenni, Karen, and Rakhine States. The junta has carried out 9,794 aerial
    bombardments, including 7,330 airstrikes, 1,305 drone strikes, 820 paramotor attacks, and 339
    gyrocopter assaults. These aerial attacks have resulted in 4,853 documented deaths. Since 2022,
    approximately 1,853 healthcare facilities have been attacked. IDP camps, schools, places of
    worship, and public gatherings are repeatedly targeted.

    On 10 December 2025, International Human Rights Day, the military conducted airstrike on
    Mrauk-U Hospital in Rakhine State, killing approximately 34 people and injuring more than ten.
    In January 2026 alone, 633 human rights violations were documented, alongside 220 aerial
    bombardments that killed at least 69 civilians. Two major massacres occurred between 21 and
    25 January: in Bhamo Township, Kachin State, at least 27 people were killed during a funeral and
    wedding; in Kyauktaw Township, Rakhine State, at least 21 people, including pregnant women
    and children, were killed. In February 2026, further airstrikes targeted displaced civilians in
    Sagaing Region, killing monastic novices, children, and villagers.

    More than 3.6 million people are internally displaced, while acute food insecurity has continued
    at catastrophic levels, affecting an estimated 12.4 million people in 2026. The junta’s attacks on
    civilian population are deliberate. They form part of a widespread and systematic pattern that
    amounts to war crimes and crimes against humanity including war crime of starvation of
    civilians. The Council must adopt urgent accountability and civilian protection measures.
    In addition, Myanmar has become a regional hub for transnational criminal activities. The
    proliferation of cyber-scam centers, human trafficking networks, and illicit narcotics production
    has accelerated, particularly in areas under the control of the junta and junta-aligned armed
    groups, militias, and military-linked business networks. These criminal economies generate
    revenue streams for the junta and actors connected to it, helping the military evade and
    withstand international sanctions.

    The consequences of these crimes extend far beyond Myanmar’s borders and have directly
    affected neighboring ASEAN countries as well as the United States and Europe. Victims—often
    trafficked individuals—are subjected to forced labor, detention, torture, and other serious
    abuses that may amount to crimes against humanity, including enslavement and imprisonment.
    The symbiotic relationship between the military junta and transnational organized crimes is now
    a central feature of its survival strategy and must be explicitly addressed by the UNHRC and the
    international community.

    In stark contrast to the junta’s violence, the people of Myanmar have continued to organize,
    resist, and build alternative political and social systems under extraordinary risks. Civil society
    organizations, human rights defenders, women, youth and LGBTIQA+ activists, and democratic
    resistance groups have established people-led governance from the ground up, challenging the
    military-constructed, centralized, repressive state system and exclusionary nationalism. Through
    survivor-centered documentation, rights-based advocacy, community education, mutual aid, and
    local administration, communities are actively shaping a different political landscape that seeks
    to ensure a peaceful and sustainable future based on principles of human rights, justice, and
    federal democracy.

    Against this backdrop, the junta attempted to manufacture political legitimacy through a
    systematically coerced and tightly controlled process. The military junta weaponized the entire
    electoral system—deploying the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party
    (USDP), mobilizing pro-junta networks, and relying on fear, intimidation, and force—to impose a
    predetermined outcome. This carefully stage-managed process was falsely presented as a
    “return to democracy,” a narrative decisively rejected by the people of Myanmar. The election
    was neither legal nor legitimate. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights publicly affirmed
    that the military-imposed elections failed to respect fundamental human rights and only
    deepened violence and societal polarization.

    The junta-controlled Union Election Commission (UEC) functioned as a direct instrument of
    military command, seeking to fabricate consent through surveillance, exclusion, and coercion.
    The three-phase election, held between December 2025 and January 2026, unfolded amid the
    widespread public boycott and junta’s heavy militarization and collapsing territorial control.
    Polling stations were largely empty, with participation limited to pro-military supporters or
    individuals coerced through threats of arrest, economic punishment, or pressure on family
    members. Electoral secrecy and voluntariness were systematically dismantled through
    surveillance, forced advance voting, and arrests under so-called election protection laws, under
    which at least 404 people—324 men and 80 women—were detained. In addition, the junta’s
    sham election took place amid ongoing massacres and airstrikes. The Office of the High
    Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) documented and reported that at least 170 people
    were killed in more than 408 military aerial attacks during the voting period between December
    2025 and January 2026.

    While we acknowledge the UNHRC resolution adopted on 4 April 2025, the crisis—now entering
    its sixth year—demands far stronger, more concrete, and time-bound actions from UN
    mechanisms and the international community.
    The UNHRC must unequivocally reject the sham election and its outcomes and make clear that
    no UN mechanism will recognize or engage with any governance structures arising from it. Any
    recognition, engagement, or technical cooperation that confers political legitimacy on the junta,
    including in the aftermath of its sham election, risks normalizing the junta’s atrocity crimes and
    further emboldening it.

    The Council must explicitly recognize and address the symbiotic relationship between the
    Myanmar military and transnational organized crimes and call for coordinated international
    action to dismantle these networks and cut off a key source of financing for the military.

    We further urge the Council to call for a comprehensive global arms embargo, including targeted
    sanctions on aviation fuel, cutting the financial flows that sustain the military’s decades-long
    impunity. Any sale, supply, or transfer of weapons, aircraft, drones, or fuel directly facilitates
    atrocity crimes and may therefore give rise to state and individual responsibility for aiding and
    abetting the Myanmar military’s crimes under international law.

    The Council must also mobilize political support for concrete accountability measures, including
    the referral of the situation in Myanmar to the International Criminal Court (ICC) or the
    establishment of an ad hoc or hybrid international criminal tribunal. We urge the Council to
    actively support the NUG’s declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute, accepting ICC
    jurisdiction, and to increase support for cases under the principles of universal jurisdiction,
    including those pursued in Argentina, Timor-Leste, and other national courts.
    Finally, the UN must move beyond reliance on ASEAN’s failed Five-Point Consensus and adopt an
    approach that support a Myanmar people-led, rights-based solution grounded in international
    law, justice, and accountability.

    Excellencies,
    We urge you to support the people of Myanmar in their unwavering resistance against the
    criminal military junta and tireless efforts to build a federal democracy from the ground up,
    despite immense suffering. We urge the Council to match their courage with decisive action—by
    rejecting the junta’s sham election and its results, dismantling the military’s capacity to continue
    committing war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other international crimes, and advancing
    accountability without delay.
    For further information, please contact:
  • Naw Cherry, Karen Peace Support Network; kpsn14@gmail.com
  • Nai Aue Mon, Human Rights Foundation of Monland; auemon@rehmonnya.org
  • Salai Za UK Ling, Chin Human Rights Organization; zauk@chinhumanrights.org
  • Khin Ohmar, Progressive Voice, info@progressive-voice.org

Signed by 235 civil society organizations, including 27 organizations that have chosen not to
disclose their names:

  1. #MilkTeaAlliance – Friends of Myanmar
  2. 5/ Lapantang Strike Column
  3. 5/ of Zaya State Strike Committee
  4. 8888 Generation (New Zealand)
  5. Action Committee for Democracy Development (ACDD)
  6. A New Burma (ANB)
  7. Ah Nah Podcast – conversations with Myanmar
  8. All Arakan Youth Organizations Network (AAYON)
  9. All Burma Democratic Front in New Zealand
  10. ALTSEAN-Burma
  11. Anti-Dictatorship in Burma – DMVPA Area
  12. Anti-Junta Alliance Yangon – AJAY
  13. Anti-junta Forces Coordination Committee – Mandalay (AFCC – Mandalay)
  14. Anyar Pyit Taing Htaung Lay Myar Strike Committee
  15. Arakan CSO Network
  16. Arakan Youth Peace Network
  17. Asia Democracy Network (AND)
  18. Asia Justice and Rights (AJAR)
  19. Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development (FORUM-ASIA)
  20. Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP)
  21. Association of Human Rights Defenders and Promoters (HRDP)
  22. Association of Spring Rainbow (ASR)
  23. Association Suisse Birmanie (ASB)
  24. Athan – Freedom of Expression Activist Organization
  25. Auckland Kachin Community NZ
  26. Auckland Zomi Community
  27. Ayadaw Strike Committee
  28. Ayeyarwaddy West Development Organisation (AWDO), Magway
  29. Ayeyarwaddy West Development Organisation (AWDO), Nagphe
  30. Blood Money Campaign (BMC)
  31. Budalin Strike Force
  32. Burma Action Ireland
  33. Burma Canadian Network
  34. Burma Concern
  35. Burma Human Rights Network (BHRN)
  36. Burma Solidarity Philippines (BSP)
  37. Burmese Atheists
  38. Burmese Community Group (Manawatu, NZ)
  39. Burmese Rohingya Organisation UK (BROUK)
  40. Burmese Rohingya Welfare Organisation New Zealand
  41. Burmese Women’s Union (BWU)
  42. Campaign for a New Myanmar
  43. CDM Medical Network (CDMMN)
  44. Chin Community of Auckland
  45. Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO)
  46. Chindwin Riverside Villages Strike Committee
  47. CIVICUS: World Alliance for Citizen Participation
  48. Civil Information Network (CIN)
  49. Civil Rights Defenders (CRD)
  50. Creative Home (CH)
  51. CRPH & NUG supporters Ireland
  52. CRPH Funding Ireland
  53. Dagon University Student’s Union (DUSU)
  54. Defend Myanmar Democracy (DMD)
  55. Democracy for Ethnic Minorities Organization (DEMO)
  56. Democracy Youths of Myanmar
  57. Democracy, Peace and Women’s Organization
  58. Educational Initiatives Prague
  59. Equality Myanmar (EQMM)
  60. Ethnic Youth General Strike Committee (Mandalay)
  61. Federal Corner
  62. Federal Myanmar Benevolence Group (NZ)
  63. Federation of Basic Education Worker Unions (FBEWU)
  64. Free Burma Campaign (South Africa) (FBC (SA))
  65. Future Light Center (FLC)
  66. General Strike Collaboration Committee (GSCC)
  67. Generation Wave (GW)
  68. Generations’ Solidarity Coalition of Nationalities – GSCN
  69. German Solidarity with Myanmar e.V.
  70. Hpakant Hmawlae Strike Force
  71. Human Rights Educators Network (HREN)
  72. Human Rights Foundation of Monland (HURFOM)
  73. India for Myanmar
  74. Info Birmanie
  75. Initiatives for International Dialogue (IID)
  76. Inle Women Union
  77. Inter Pares
  78. International Campaign for the Rohingya
  79. Italia-Birmania.Insieme
  80. Justice & Equality Focus (JEF)
  81. Kachin Women Association Thailand (KWAT)
  82. Kalay Township People’s Strike Steering Committee – KPSSC
  83. Kani Township Strike Steering Committee
  84. Kantbalu Township Strike Force
  85. Karen Human Rights Group (KHRG)
  86. Karen Peace Support Network (KPSN)
  87. Karen Swedish Community (KSC)
  88. Karen Women’s Organization (KWO)
  89. Karenni Civil Society Network – KCSN
  90. Karenni Human Rights Group (KnHRG)
  91. Karenni National Women’s Organization (KNWO)
  92. Karenni Society New Zealand
  93. Kawthoolei Women’s Network
  94. Keng Tung Youth
  95. Kyae Lak Myay
  96. Kyan Rescue Committee (KRC)
  97. Kyauktada Strike Committee (KSC)
  98. La Communauté Birmane de France
  99. Latpadaung Anti-coup Strike Force
  100. Latpadaung Region Strike Committee
  101. Legal Aid for Human Rights
  102. Let’s Help Each Other (LHEO)
  103. LGBT Alliance Myanmar
  104. Magway People’s Revolution Committee
  105. Magway Region Human Rights Network (MHRN)
  106. Mandalay Medical Family (MFM)
  107. Mandalay Regional Youth Association – Revolution Core Group (MRYA – RCG)
  108. Mandalay Strike Force (MSF)
  109. MATA Sagaing
  110. MayMyo Strike Force
  111. Mekong Watch
  112. Metta Campaign Mandalay
  113. Milk Tea Alliance Calendar Team
  114. Monywa People’s Strike Steering Committee
  115. Monywa-Amyint Road Strike Committee
  116. Myanmar (CRPH) Support Group, Norway
  117. Myanmar Accountability Project (MAP)
  118. Myanmar Action Group Denmark
  119. Myanmar anti-military coup movement in New Zealand
  120. Myanmar Campaign Network (Australia)
  121. Myanmar Community Group Christchurch New Zealand
  122. Myanmar Community Group Dunedin New Zealand
  123. Myanmar Emergency Fund – Canada (MEF – Canada)
  124. Myanmar Engineers – New Zealand
  125. Myanmar Gonye (New Zealand)
  126. Myanmar Labour Alliance (MLA)
  127. Myanmar Muslim Revolutionary Force
  128. Myanmar People Alliance (Shan State)
  129. Myanmar Student Christian Movement
  130. Myanmar Students’ Union in New Zealand
  131. Myaung People Strike Steering Committee
  132. MyaYar Knowledge Tree
  133. Myingyan Civilian Movement Committee
  134. Nelson Myanmar Community Group New Zealand
  135. Network for Human Rights Documentation – Burma (ND-Burma)
  136. New Bloom (Taiwan)
  137. New Myanmar Foundation (NMF)
  138. New Step Women Empowerment Group (NSWG)
  139. New Zealand Campaign for Myanmar
  140. New Zealand Doctors for NUG
  141. New Zealand Karen Association
  142. New Zealand Zo Community Inc.
  143. No Business With Genocide
  144. Nyan Lynn Thit Analytica (NLTA)
  145. Olive Organization
  146. Overseas Mon Association, New Zealand
  147. Pale People’s Strike Steering Committee
  148. Political Prisoners Network – Myanmar (PPNM)
  149. Progressive Muslim Youth Association (PMYA)
  150. Progressive Voice (PV)
  151. Pwintphyu Development Organisation (PDO)
  152. Pyithu Gonye (New Zealand)
  153. Queers of Burma Alternative (QBA)
  154. Rohingya Maìyafuìnor Collaborative Network (RMCN)
  155. Rural Community Development Society
  156. Rvwang Community Association New Zealand
  157. Save Myanmar – USA
  158. Save Myanmar (San Francisco)
  159. Save Myanmar Fundraising Group (New Zealand)
  160. SEA Junction
  161. Shan Community (New Zealand)
  162. Shan MATA
  163. Shwebo Strike Force
  164. Sisters2Sisters
  165. Sitt Nyein Pann Foundation (SNPF)
  166. Southern Initiatives (SI)
  167. Southern Youth Development Organization (SYDO)
  168. Spring Revolution Myanmar Muslim Community (SRMMC)
  169. Spring Traveller
  170. Sujata Sisters Group (NZ)
  171. Ta Mar Institute of Development
  172. Ta’ang Women Organization (TWO)
  173. The Ladies Organization
  174. The Nation Voice
  175. S. Campaign for Burma (USCB)
  176. Union of Karenni State Youth (UKSY)
  177. Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (UUSC)
  178. University of Medicine Mandalay Student Union Revolutionary Front – UMMSURF
  179. University Students’ Unions Alumni Force
  180. Volunteers in Myanmar
  181. Wetlet Strike Committee
  182. White Coat Society Yangon (WCSY)
  183. Women Alliance Burma (WAB)
  184. Women for Justice (WJ)
  185. Women Lead Resource Center
  186. Yadanabon University Students’ Union (YDNBUSU)
  187. Yangon 4 Brothers
  188. Yangon Deaf Group
  189. Yaw Land’s IDP Support Network
  190. Yinmarbin-Sarlingyi All Villages People Strike Leading Committee
  191. Youth Empowerment (YE)
  192. Youth Resources Strike Committee – Chaung U Township
  193. ဂန့်ဂေါဖွံ့ဖြိုးတိုးတက်ရေးအဖွဲ့
  194. ငြိမ်းချမ်းရေးစာသင်ခန်း – Peace Classroom
  195. စွန်ရဲဌာနေ (လေကြောင်းရန်ကာကွယ်ရေးကွန်ယက်)
  196. တမာကောလိပ်
  197. နွေဦးတမာရပ်ဝန်း
  198. နားဆင်သူများအဖွဲ့
  199. ပဉ္စမမဏ္ဏိုင်
  200. မင်းလှတောင်သူများအစုအဖွဲ့
  201. မျက်မှောက်ခေတ်
  202. မျိုးဆက်-Generations
  203. မလိအင်ဗွပ်အမျိုးသမီးများအဖွဲ့
  204. ယိမ်းနွဲ့ပါး
  205. ရင်းမြစ်ဌာနေ (လေကြောင်းရန်ကာကွယ်ရေးကွန်ယက်)
  206. သင့်မြတ်လိုသူများအဖွဲ့
  207. သမိုင်းသယ်ဆောင်သူများ
  208. အညာလွင်ပြင်ရပ်ဝန်း

ထောက်ခံလက်မှတ် ထပ်မံရရှိထားသော အဖွဲ့များ

  • Justice For Myanmar
  • Integria, z.u. (Czech Republic)

အိတ်ဖွင့်ပေးစာကို PDF ဖြင့် ရယူရန် (မြန်မာဘာသာ ၊ English)

Lives in the Absence of Safety

The Ta’ang Women’s Organization (TWO) has released a report titled ‘Lives in the Absence of Safety.’
This field report documents human rights violations committed by the “terror” military council in northern Shan State from February 1, 2021, to 2024, following the coup d’état.

The report highlights severe human rights abuses, the situation in the Ta’ang region before and after the coup, and the overall deterioration of social conditions.
It also covers the airstrikes targeting civilians during Operation 1027, the dire living conditions of internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the status of rehabilitation assistance.
Furthermore, it presents findings on the regional situation under the administration of revolutionary organizations.

Screenshot

Ira­nian shadow fleet fuels Myan­mar junta’s expand­ing air cam­paign against civil­ians

LONDON (Reu­ters) – The first bomb to strike the remote west­ern Myan­mar vil­lage of Vanha came from a junta war­plane. It hit the only school in the ham­let, near the front­line of Myan­mar’s civil war. The second came from a drone minutes later.

On that day, Octo­ber 13, 2025, an Ira­nian tanker was headed home from Myan­mar, where it had recently unloaded more than 16,000 tons of jet fuel under a cloak of elec­tronic scram­bling – enough for thou­sands more fighter jet sorties.

Illi­cit Ira­nian deliv­er­ies of jet fuel have powered an expans­ive bomb­ing cam­paign by the Myan­mar junta that has struck more than 1,000 civil­ian loc­a­tions in 15 months, a Reu­ters invest­ig­a­tion has found. Iran has also dis­patched car­goes of urea, a key ingredi­ent in the junta’s muni­tions, includ­ing the bombs it drops from drones and paragliders.

Taken together, the Ira­nian deliv­er­ies to Myan­mar’s mil­it­ary have helped shift the dynamic of the five-year civil war, which pits the junta against an array of rebel groups, none of which have a con­ven­tional air force or a ready sup­ply of weapons as power­ful as the bombs and mis­siles launched by fighter jets. And for Iran’s embattled gov­ern­ment, the trade has brought in new rev­enue and influ­ence, as sanc­tions tighten and old allies lose power.

By the time the war­plane swooped over Vanha and bombed the school, Myan­mar’s air force had already received huge quant­it­ies of Ira­nian jet fuel. Two stu­dents died that day and 22 people were wounded, accord­ing to one of the wounded, a man who was in the school­yard, and Chin Human Rights Organ­iz­a­tion, which doc­u­ments junta attacks in the region.

Most of the chil­dren were out­side clean­ing up the yard at the time, the wounded man said, or the toll would have been far worse. Vanha’s dead were among at least 1,728 civil­ians killed in gov­ern­ment air­strikes since the Ira­nian deliv­er­ies began, accord­ing to data com­piled by Burma News Inter­na­tional-Myan­mar Peace Mon­itor, which tracks the con­flict.

From Octo­ber 2024 to Decem­ber 2025, Iran delivered a total of about 175,000 tons of jet fuel to the junta in nine ship­ments from Reef and a lar­ger sis­ter ship, Noble, accord­ing to ship­ping doc­u­ments reviewed by Reu­ters, and satel­lite imagery and ana­lysis by the US firm Syn­Max Intel­li­gence.

The doc­u­ments and other ship­ping data show the two ships sail­ing out of Iran have been Myan­mar’s primary sup­pli­ers of jet fuel since the deliv­er­ies began. The surge in Ira­nian imports also includes hun­dreds of thou­sands of tons of urea. The pet­ro­chem­ical product is typ­ic­ally a fer­til­izer ingredi­ent, but Myan­mar’s junta also uses it in muni­tions, accord­ing to two sol­diers who defec­ted from the mil­it­ary.

Although the intensi­fy­ing air cam­paign has been widely doc­u­mented, Iran’s cent­ral role in fuel­ing it and sup­ply­ing urea has not been pre­vi­ously repor­ted.

The deliv­er­ies, which are cir­cum­vent­ing West­ern sanc­tions on both Iran and Myan­mar, are a badly needed crutch for their troubled repress­ive gov­ern­ments.

The United Nations Spe­cial Rap­por­teur on Human Rights in Myan­mar, respond­ing to find­ings about the Ira­nian ship­ments to Myan­mar, called for the Ira­nian gov­ern­ment to be held account­able for the actions of its new cus­tomer.

“This fuel that is being shipped in from Iran is lit­er­ally fuel­ing mass atro­cit­ies,” Tom Andrews said. “There has been an escal­a­tion in attacks on civil­ian tar­gets. It’s just hor­rific and unac­cept­able. It’s import­ant to point out those that are enabling it.”

Iran’s UN mis­sion declined to com­ment, and Myan­mar’s gov­ern­ment did not respond. Report­ers were unable to reach the own­ers of Reef and Noble; an email lis­ted as a con­tact was not valid.

IRAN’S THEOCRACY, reel­ing from US and Israeli mil­it­ary attacks and the col­lapse of its cur­rency, has just crushed anti-gov­ern­ment protests that posed one of the greatest threats to the Islamic Repub­lic since 1979. It is des­per­ate for money, after years of sanc­tions.

Myan­mar’s mil­it­ary dic­tat­or­ship is also try­ing to quell a rebel­lion that erup­ted after the junta staged a coup in 2021. The fuel has helped at a crit­ical moment. Its 100 or so war­planes, includ­ing Chinese-designed JF-17s, Rus­sian MiG-29s and Suk­hoi-30s, are fly­ing far more bomb­ing raids since the fuel trade boomed. Myan­mar’s rebels are increas­ingly strug­gling to keep con­trol of ter­rit­ory in the face of the junta’s dom­in­ance of the skies.

Reef and Noble, both sanc­tioned by the United States in 2024, star­ted mak­ing the roughly 5,500-kilo­meter voy­ages from Iran to Myan­mar in Octo­ber of that year, falsi­fy­ing their jour­neys using a tech­nique called spoof­ing that is com­mon among cargo ships and tankers mak­ing illi­cit deliv­er­ies.

Since that first deliv­ery until Decem­ber 31, Myan­mar’s mil­it­ary car­ried out 1,022 air­strikes on civil­ian tar­gets, more than double the num­ber from the pre­vi­ous 15-month period, accord­ing to Myan­mar Peace Mon­itor data. Reu­ters has not been able to inde­pend­ently con­firm the num­ber of air­strikes or civil­ian cas­u­al­ties.

Vanha’s approx­im­ately 260 res­id­ents live within a roughly 500-meter radius of the school, and when the air­strike hit, the shock wave rippled through their homes. Video veri­fied by Reu­ters shows people flee­ing when the second explo­sion rings out from the drone.

The vil­lage, ringed by for­es­ted moun­tains, is in Chin state, an impov­er­ished west­ern province bor­der­ing India, where the junta is attempt­ing to claw back ter­rit­ory from rebels. Before the year was done, mil­it­ary jets bombed two other schools within 70 kilo­met­ers of Vanha, accord­ing to the Chin Human Rights Organ­iz­a­tion.

Most of Vanha’s vil­la­gers are now so scared of another air­strike that they sleep in the sur­round­ing jungle and emerge from the tree can­opy to return home only when neces­sary, said the man wounded that day. “Why are they attack­ing inno­cent civil­ians and young chil­dren?” he asked.

Reu­ters could not con­firm whether the war­plane that struck Vanha was fly­ing on Ira­nian jet fuel. However, it had been more than a year since the fuel had come from any­where else, the doc­u­ments and ship­ping data show.

The move­ment of the Ira­nian ships was tracked using satel­lite images and ana­lysis provided by Syn­Max. The data cor­rob­or­ated details lis­ted in the ship­ping doc­u­ments, which con­tained the ves­sels’ names, cargo, port calls, and arrival and depar­ture dates.

People and com­pan­ies con­nec­ted to the ter­minal where Reef and Noble off-loaded their liquid cargo, near Myan­mar’s com­mer­cial cap­ital of Yan­gon, have been sanc­tioned by the United States, Canada, the European Union, and Bri­tain for sup­ply­ing jet fuel to the mil­it­ary.

An ana­lyst who tracks Ira­nian ship­ping also con­firmed some jet fuel deliv­er­ies. Some of Reef’s and Noble’s vis­its to the ter­minal were fur­ther con­firmed by Myan­mar Wit­ness, a project of the Cen­ter for Inform­a­tion Resi­li­ence, an organ­iz­a­tion focused on expos­ing human rights viol­a­tions.

Pub­licly avail­able ship-track­ing data and Myan­mar Port Author­ity records also con­firmed addi­tional inform­a­tion in the doc­u­ments, includ­ing the deliv­er­ies of urea.

Iran’s export surge to Myan­mar fol­lows a series of pun­it­ive West­ern export bans on mater­i­als that could be used by the junta to repress civil­ians. Those eco­nomic sanc­tions raised the risks for com­mer­cial fuel sup­pli­ers and dis­trib­ut­ors to sell to Myan­mar, prompt­ing most to exit the coun­try.

In a response to ques­tions about Iran’s role in sup­ply­ing Myan­mar’s mil­it­ary, the US Treas­ury Depart­ment said Iran’s quest for new mar­kets was a sign that the Trump admin­is­tra­tion’s eco­nomic pres­sure had been suc­cess­ful. “The regime’s oil profits are being choked,” an offi­cial said.

The for­eign affairs offices of the EU and Canada declined to com­ment. Bri­tain’s For­eign Office noted that it had more than 550 sanc­tions imposed on Iran over its nuc­lear pro­gram and human rights viol­a­tions, includ­ing the Islamic Revolu­tion­ary Guard Corps (IRGC) and 25 indi­vidu­als and 39 entit­ies in Myan­mar since the coup.

“The UK con­demns human rights viol­a­tions by the Myan­mar mil­it­ary, includ­ing air­strikes on civil­ian infra­struc­ture,” the For­eign Office spokes­man said.

Iran has a long his­tory of mil­it­ary sup­port for allies, includ­ing Bashar al-Assad in Syria, Hezbol­lah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and former pres­id­ent Nic­olas Maduro in Venezuela. The sales to Myan­mar are part of a broader strategy of extend­ing its influ­ence by deep­en­ing ties with other isol­ated gov­ern­ments – espe­cially after the fall of older allies since the end of 2024, accord­ing to ana­lysts. Assad and Maduro are now out of power, and Hezbol­lah and Hamas are strug­gling to recover from mil­it­ary defeats by Israel.

The sales also replen­ish state cof­fers depleted by the sanc­tions and Iran’s con­flict with Israel. Jet fuel com­mands a 33% premium com­pared to Brent crude, mean­ing Iran could have earned about $123 mil­lion for those nine ship­ments of jet fuel at cur­rent mar­ket prices, accord­ing to estim­ates based on Inter­na­tional Air Trans­port Asso­ci­ation data.

ON SEPTEMBER 15, 2025, Reef’s loc­a­tion trans­mit­ter pinged off the south­ern coast of Iraq near the Bas­rah Oil Ter­minal.

Satel­lite imagery of the area at the time, however, shows no sign of the ves­sel. Reef was actu­ally at the Ira­nian port of Bandar Abbas, load­ing fuel 8 kilo­met­ers away from a refinery that pro­duces jet fuel and is over­seen by the National Ira­nian Oil Refin­ing and Dis­tri­bu­tion Com­pany, known as NIORDC, Syn­Max satel­lite imagery shows.

At times, dur­ing load­ing, Reef’s cover slipped and the loc­a­tion trans­mit­ter gave away its accur­ate pos­i­tion, before revert­ing to the fake loc­a­tion, Syn­Max data show.

US and EU sanc­tions doc­u­ments show NIORDC is a sub­si­di­ary of the National Ira­nian Oil Com­pany, which con­trols Iran’s pet­ro­leum exports and gen­er­ates huge amounts of money for the IRGC.

The US Office of For­eign Assets Con­trol, the arm of the Treas­ury Depart­ment in charge of sanc­tions, iden­ti­fied the National Ira­nian Oil Com­pany as an “agent or affil­i­ate” of the IRGC in 2012.

Reef is part of Iran’s shadow fleet – a net­work of ves­sels used to secretly trans­port illi­cit cargo. The Ira­nian fleet ships $50 bil­lion worth of oil each year to cus­tom­ers abroad, by far its largest source of for­eign cur­rency and its prin­cipal con­nec­tion to the global eco­nomy, Reu­ters repor­ted in 2024.

The IRGC, with con­trol over both the coun­try’s illi­cit eco­nomy and its internal secur­ity, dom­in­ates the fuel-smug­gling net­works and other busi­ness interests that have been a life­line for Iran’s elite. But the organ­iz­a­tion has pro­voked pop­u­lar back­lash with its viol­ent sup­pres­sion of dis­sent, cor­rup­tion and strangle­hold over the eco­nomy, accord­ing to ana­lysts and sanc­tions experts.

Reef and Noble and their owner, Sea Route Ship Man­age­ment FZE, were sanc­tioned by the US in 2024 for “know­ingly” trans­port­ing Ira­nian pet­ro­chem­ical products. Reef has changed its name and flag of regis­tra­tion three times in as many years – a com­mon tac­tic in the shadow fleet.

Reef and Noble docked at the Myan Oil Ter­minal, a facil­ity on the out­skirts of Yan­gon pre­vi­ously known as Puma, Syn­Max imagery showed. In an archived web­site, a former cor­por­ate owner said it handled 100% of Myan­mar’s mar­ket for jet fuel, which spoils eas­ily and requires spe­cial­ized stor­age and trans­port.

West­ern gov­ern­ments have des­ig­nated the net­work of com­pan­ies con­nec­ted to the facil­ity – includ­ing Myan Oil, Swan Energy, Shoon Energy, and Asia Sun Group – as key part­ners of the junta in import­ing, stor­ing, and dis­trib­ut­ing jet fuel. Those firms and two asso­ci­ated indi­vidu­als, Zaw Min Tun and Win Kyaw Kyaw Aung, were sanc­tioned for sup­ply­ing the fuel to the mil­it­ary.

Neither Myan Oil nor the net­work of com­pan­ies and people con­nec­ted to the ter­minal respon­ded to requests for com­ment. In many cases, email addresses for them that were lis­ted in the sanc­tions notices were invalid.

THE SHIFT toward Ira­nian sup­plies under­scores a broader realign­ment in rela­tions between Iran and Myan­mar’s mil­it­ary, known as the Tatmadaw.

In 2017, Ira­nian pres­id­ent Has­san Rouh­ani strongly cri­ti­cized the Tatmadaw, after it mas­sacred thou­sands of Rohingya, a mainly Muslim minor­ity. As waves of Rohingya civil­ians fled to Bangladesh fol­low­ing the mil­it­ary offens­ive, Rouh­ani’s admin­is­tra­tion urged Islamic nations to help end the crisis.

“The inter­na­tional com­munity has no excuse to allow the gen­o­cide of Rohingya Muslims to con­tinue in front of our eyes,” Ira­nian for­eign min­is­ter Mohammad Javad Zarif said that Septem­ber.

But after the Tatmadaw ous­ted the civil­ian gov­ern­ment led by Nobel Peace Prize win­ner Aung San Suu Kyi in 2021, there was a rap­proche­ment. In Janu­ary 2022, an Ira­nian gov­ern­ment del­eg­a­tion secretly vis­ited Myan­mar to meet with mem­bers of the mil­it­ary, accord­ing to a regional secur­ity source who closely tracks the junta. The visit was first repor­ted by Asia Times.

They were there to sell Ira­nian weapons, includ­ing guided mis­siles and other mil­it­ary equip­ment, said the secur­ity source, who spoke on con­di­tion of anonym­ity. The source described the visit as a sign that Iran had decided in favor of mil­it­ary sup­port for the junta, while also expand­ing its arms-export mar­ket.

“When push comes to shove, they can make the neces­sary adjust­ments,” said Danny Cit­rinow­icz, a former Israeli intel­li­gence officer and now senior Iran researcher at the Insti­tute for National Secur­ity Stud­ies think tank, refer­ring to Iran’s pivot to Myan­mar. “You can flex the ideo­logy where it’s a stra­tegic interest. And def­in­itely Myan­mar is a coun­try that’s inter­est­ing to them.”

In addi­tion to increas­ing jet fuel deliv­er­ies, Iran has over the past three years become a primary source of Myan­mar’s urea, which the junta has used to man­u­fac­ture explos­ives. Three trade ana­lysts who track the imports closely said Iran’s sup­plies have increased drastic­ally. The annual volume of such Ira­nian imports into Myan­mar could be in the range of 400,000 and 600,000 tons, accord­ing to two of them.

At least two ves­sels that trans­port bulk car­goes, Golden ES and Rasha, delivered urea from Iran to Myan­mar last year, port author­ity data and satel­lite imagery show. As with Reef and Noble, Golden ES and Rasha manip­u­lated their onboard loc­a­tion trans­mit­ters to dis­guise their depar­ture point, accord­ing to Syn­Max. The quant­it­ies of urea described by the ana­lysts would entail mul­tiple deliv­er­ies, but Reu­ters was unable to con­firm other ship­ments.

The own­ers of Golden ES and Rasha did not respond to requests for com­ment.

Major Naung Yoe, a sol­dier who said he defec­ted from the mil­it­ary in 2021 to avoid killing civil­ians and joined the rebel­lion, said urea ends up in two ord­nance factor­ies in cent­ral Myan­mar, where it can be integ­rated into mul­tiple kinds of explos­ives, includ­ing bombs dropped from drones and paragliders. Another defec­ted sol­dier con­firmed the urea-based muni­tions.

Deep­en­ing com­mer­cial ties have been accom­pan­ied by recent high-level polit­ical engage­ment between Myan­mar and Iran.

In Decem­ber 2025, Ira­nian Pres­id­ent Masoud Pezeshkian sat across from Myan­mar’s Prime Min­is­ter Nyo Saw on the side­lines of a sum­mit in Turk­menistan. An Ira­nian readout of the meet­ing said Nyo Saw emphas­ized the desire to expand cooper­a­tion in oil imports and extrac­tion tech­no­logy.

Iran was also invited to send mon­it­ors to observe Myan­mar’s phased gen­eral elec­tion that star­ted on Decem­ber 28, 2025. It was a vote that the oppos­i­tion, the UN, and many inter­na­tional observ­ers described as neither free nor fair. Myan­mar’s junta has said the elec­tion was suc­cess­ful and broadly pop­u­lar.

AS THE elec­tion approached, the Tatmadaw con­tin­ued its aer­ial bom­bard­ment of civil­ian areas.

Wai Hun Aung, an aid worker, was at home late on Decem­ber 10 when he heard a plane fly­ing over­head. Moments later, a massive explo­sion shook his house in Mrauk-U town in Rakhine state, a coastal province bor­der­ing Bangladesh where the mil­it­ary has been locked in fierce fight­ing with the Arakan Army rebel group.

“I was ter­ri­fied. I knew instantly that we were being tar­geted by an air­strike,” Wai Hun Aung said.

It was not until dawn, when he reached the town’s main hos­pital on his motor­bike, that the aid worker grasped the scale of destruc­tion.

Rel­at­ives of patients swarmed the wreck­age of the hos­pital, look­ing for sur­viv­ors, he said. At least 30 people were killed and more than 70 wounded, accord­ing to Reu­ters report­ing. It was among the dead­li­est aer­ial attacks of the civil war.

Only days earlier, Reef had made another cov­ert deliv­ery to Myan­mar, unload­ing nearly 15,000 met­ric tons of jet fuel, accord­ing to the doc­u­ments and satel­lite images. As on pre­vi­ous trips, the crew spoofed its loc­a­tion to falsely show it was sail­ing from Iraq’s Bas­rah Oil Ter­minal to Chit­tagong in Bangladesh.

A port author­ity offi­cial in Chit­tagong said he wasn’t aware of the spoof­ing oper­a­tion. Iraq’s gov­ern­ment did not respond to requests for com­ment.

Pick­ing his way through the rubble that morn­ing, Wai Hun Aung said he found bod­ies and severed limbs scattered across what had been wards and oper­at­ing theat­ers in a 300-bed hos­pital.

“It felt like the end of the world,” he said in a series of audio mes­sages, “the sound of cry­ing from out­side and the sight of the bod­ies inside.”

The hos­pital in Mrauk-U lies in ruins, but the tankers that enabled the destruc­tion keep mov­ing. In late Janu­ary, as the Ira­nian protests were crushed, Syn­Max data showed Noble again pre­tend­ing to be anchored off the south­ern tip of Iraq. In real­ity, the ship was loiter­ing near the Ira­nian port of Bandar Abbas, wait­ing to set sail. was loaded and on its way back toward Yan­gon.

The Jerusalem Post

With international law at a ‘breaking point’, a tiny country goes after Myanmar’s junta on its own

Just four months ago, Timor-Leste formally became a member of the Association of Southeast Asian States (ASEAN).

This week, the tiny country took an unprecedented step: its judicial authorities appointed a prosecutor to examine the Myanmar military’s responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity. It’s believed to be the first time an ASEAN state has taken such an action against another member.

The case resulted from the persistence of a victims’ group, the Chin Human Rights Organisation, in pursuing justice for the Chin people, a minority group in Myanmar. In submitting the complaint, the head of the organisation expressed solidarity with Timor-Leste’s own historic efforts to secure justice and independence.

Timor-Leste authorities will now assess whether to bring charges against Myanmar’s military leaders, including junta chief Min Aung Hlaing.

Any prosecutions would be on the basis of “universal jurisdiction”. This is a legal principle that allows domestic courts to hear cases alleging international crimes, regardless of where the crimes occurred, or the nationality of the victims or perpetrators.

Limitations of international courts

This week, a major study of 23 conflicts around the globe said the international legal system designed to protect civilians is at a “breaking point”. Observers are also asking whether the United Nations has any future at all.

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It has long been clear that international courts have limited efficacy in prosecuting cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Critics argue the International Criminal Court (ICC) has engaged in selective prosecutions, is too slow and has weak enforcement powers. In the past 20 years, the court has heard 34 cases and issued just 13 convictions.

However, proponents of the court say it has been unfairly maligned and targeted, including by the Trump administration, which imposed sanctions on it last year.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ), meanwhile, can hold states accountable for crimes, but not individuals.

Both the ICC and ICJ have investigations underway on Myanmar, but they deal with crimes allegedly committed against the Rohingya minority group before the coup. The ICC case covers incidents committed partly in Bangladesh.

The ICC’s chief prosecutor asked the court’s judges to issue an arrest warrant for Min Aung Hlang in November 2024. More than a year later, a decision has yet to be made.

Challenges for domestic courts

In this environment, universal jurisdiction could play a more important role. The United Nations has implicitly recognised this by establishing investigative mechanisms for Syria and Myanmar that gather evidence for future prosecutions in domestic, regional or international courts.

Many states have laws that allow them to prosecute international crimes like torture, genocide or war crimes. What is lacking are resources to fund investigations and transparent criteria or guidelines for how to undertake them.

There are other challenges once cases are underway, too. For one, domestic courts have limited reach. Arrests are difficult, as high-level officials can rely on diplomatic immunity or just avoid the countries where they believe they could face prosecution or extradition.

Prosecuting even lower-level or mid-level perpetrators can be politically awkward. Cases can be expensive and practically difficult, especially when witnesses and evidence are mostly overseas.

The scale and complex nature of these crimes can also be challenging for domestic criminal courts that have limited experience with them.

And if trials go ahead, victims can still find justice elusive, even if the cases have broader strategic or symbolic aims.

Still, there have been successes. Nearly 10 years ago, the former president of Chad, Hissène Habré, was convicted of international crimes in Senegal. The case was tried using universal jurisdiction, driven by civil society networks.

More countries need to step up

This latest initiative in Timor-Leste comes after victim groups have tried many different countries to seek justice for the people of Myanmar. This includes Argentina, where arrest warrants were issued for Myanmar’s leadersTurkey, and Germany.

In the Asia-Pacific, lawyers have also attempted to bring cases in Indonesia and the Philippines.

While European countries are increasingly using universal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes, other countries have been less keen to take these cases on. For instance, some suggest Canada and Australia could do more to investigate war crimes cases, even though they both have the laws in place to do so.

This just leaves the heavy lifting of prosecutions to others, possibly in courts with more limited resources.

With atrocities continuing to be committed around the world, it’s become more vital than ever for governments to not just back international justice with strong words, but show a real commitment to investigating them at home.

Source : theconversation