Skyfall: Myanmar’s junta targets IDP camp without warning

On 1 February 2021, the Burmese military attempted a coup, resulting in the rise of a national resistance movement on an unprecedented scale. Following a brutal crackdown and a national uprising on an unprecedented scale, 4,160 people, including pro-democracy activists and civilians have been killed by the junta and pro-military groups, 25,353 people have been arrested and 19,632 are currently in detention.

Resistance to the junta took many forms, including establishment of the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), National Unity Government (NUG), National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC) and the National Unity Government (NUG). The People’s Defense Force (PDF) was established in May 2021 by the NUG, to serve as the armed wing of the resistence movement. Since then, the PDF in various forms has operated nationwide, both under and outside of NUG authority, including in the areas that were historically non-conflict, such as Sagaing and Magway Region and in areas controlled by Ethnic Revolution Organizations (EROs). 

Chin State, Karen State, Karenni (Kayah) State, Kachin State, Sagaing and Magway regions are among those targeted with routine air and ground strikes by Military Junta. According to UNHCR, the number of estimated of IDPs displaced within Myanmar at the beginning of the coup was 306, 200 and IDPs increased in post-coup as of 23rd October 2023 is 1,659,600, which means displacement has increased by 441% since February 2021. Since the coup, the junta has failed to take control of the country, and the Special Advisory Council for Myanmar (SAC-M)’s own report released in 2022 stated that the junta can only control of around 20 percent of the country’s townships. The rest areas were either controlled or heavily contested by ethnic resistance organizations (EROs) and local PDFs.

Human Rights Situation weekly update (November 8 to 14, 2023)

Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in Sagaing Region, Bago Region, and Shan State from November 8th to 14th. Over 25 civilians died and around 10 were injured by the Military Junta airstrikes and bomb attacks. The Military announced Martial Law at 8 Townships in Shan State. They also announced Section 144 of the Criminal Procedure Code in Sittwe, Rakhine State on November 13th.

Over 60 civilians died and almost 40 were injured within a week by the heavy and light artillery attacks of the Military Junta . 5 underaged children died when the Military Junta committed violations. Military Junta Troop arrested the director of a humanitarian Organization in Sittwe, Rakhine State, and took 2 of their cars in Loikaw, Kayah State.

Locals flee Laukkai as fighting between military, resistance nears

As some 2,000 people are believed to have left the Kokang town, the UN announces that recent displacement across northern Shan State totals 50,000

Thousands of people have reportedly fled the town of Laukkai (Laukkaing) in the Kokang Self-Administered Zone in northern Shan State, fearing that clashes between the military and the Brotherhood Alliance of ethnic armed organisations may be imminent.

The allied resistance forces, including the Ta’ang National Liberation Army, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Arakan Army, have already seized control of the town of Chin Shwe Haw, 15 miles from Laukkai, as well as several other locations in the region, as part of Operation 1027, launched on October 27. To stop the arrival of junta reinforcements, they have also blocked roads, including the national highway connecting Mandalay with the northern Shan State administrative centre of Lashio, and the section which connects Lashio to Laukkai through Hsenwi Township.

Locals estimated that up to 2,000 people had left Laukkai recently, becoming stranded eight miles south of the town near the village of Par Hsin Kyaw, on the way to Chin Shwe Haw, due to road blocks. As of Tuesday evening, the MNDAA had reportedly allowed internally displaced persons from Laukkai some use of alternative routes while keeping main transportation veins blocked. 

As of Thursday, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said that some 50,000 people across northern Shan State had recently been displaced, in addition to 40,000 in Sagaing Region and Kachin State.

Laukkai was under the control of the Myanmar junta and its allied militias at the time of reporting. The chairperson of the military-appointed administration team for the Kokang area—Myint Swe—was believed to still be in the regime capital of Naypyitaw after attending an emergency meeting called by junta chief Min Aung Hlaing of the National Defence and Security Council on Wednesday. Several other key figures from the Kokang Region with close ties to the military had also reportedly left the town. 

The junta-appointed council for the Kokang region issued a statement on October 28 claiming it was fully capable of “defending” Laukkai if attacked. 

As of Wednesday, Myanmar army soldiers and their affiliates announced through megaphones that all shops in Laukkai were required to close, several locals said, adding that fully armed military vehicles were seen patrolling the town’s streets. 

A 30-year-old man working in Laukkai told Myanmar Now that the junta had covered windows and doors with bricks on the top floors of hotels and high buildings.

“They’d already been stationed inside high buildings in Laukkai since November 1. At least seven junta soldiers were deployed in each building,” he explained, adding that soldiers had put barbed wire around the entrances and exits to the town.

Myanmar Now was unable to independently verify his claims. 

Since Tuesday, residents reported hearing gunshots fired within the town, but noted that since Operation 1027 was launched, every day the military had fired missiles and heavy weapons in the direction they believed Brotherhood Alliance forces to be stationed outside of Laukkai. 

The prices of basic commodities were also on the rise, and increasingly rare to locate, with a 50-kilogram sack of rice selling for 400,000 to 800,000 kyat (US$190-$380). 

Even the price of instant noodles had doubled, a local man said. 

“It’s not only that commodity prices are rising. It’s the fact that we can only buy dried commodities from China. The other basic commodities have gone out of stock.”

Myanmar Now News

Human Rights Situation weekly update (November 1 to 7, 2023)

Human Rights Violations took place in States and Regions from Nov 1 to 7, 2023

Military Junta Troop launched airstrikes and dropped bombs in the Sagaing Region, Bago Region, Shan State, and Chin State from November 1st to 7th. Military Junta arrested the local civilians and used them as human shields in Shan State and Mandalay Region. They also arrested 5 people from Mandalay who wrote about supporting the 1027 Operation. Military Junta Troop arrested the rice truck in the Tanintharyi Region and took the rice bags.

Over 30 civilians were killed and 34 injured by the Military’s heavy and light artillery attacks within a week. Civilians left their places 5 times within a week because of the Military Junta Troop’s matching and raiding. An underaged child was injured and 5 children died when the Military Junta committed violations.

Four days of fighting in Myanmar’s Kawlin city displaces 50,000

The military responded to attacks by anti-junta forces with air and artillery strikes.

After four days of intense battles with the military in northern Myanmar’s Sagaing region, armed resistance groups have occupied the city of Kawlin, but residents and aid workers say the fighting has displaced 50,000 people, stoking fears of a humanitarian crisis.

On Nov. 3, anti-junta People’s Defense Force paramilitaries under the shadow National Unity Government and ethnic Kachin Independence Army soldiers launched attacks on a junta police station, general administration office and schools where troops were stationed in downtown Kawlin.

The attacks sparked clashes that lasted until Nov. 6, during which the military responded with airstrikes on the district-level city, an aid worker told RFA Burmese on Tuesday, speaking on condition of anonymity due to security concerns.

By the time the dust had settled on Monday, the People’s Defense Force, or PDF, and Kachin Independence Army, or KIA, had assumed joint control of Kawlin, but at least 10 civilians were dead and 50,000 others had fled their homes to shelter on the outskirts of the city, the aid worker said.

“About four or five … people were also injured by small arms and shelling,” he said, adding that the bodies of the 10 dead were discovered as rescue workers cleared debris from city streets on Nov. 6.

Anti-junta forces are providing medical treatment to the injured, although the exact number of casualties is still being determined, the aid worker said.

‘Afraid of airstrikes’

A woman who fled the city on Nov. 4 as airstrikes and artillery strikes intensified told RFA that the displaced “don’t feel safe returning home” amid a lack of security.

“Our family left by motorbike for rural areas to be safe amid the conflict,” she said, adding that they couldn’t bring any of their belongings “except the clothes on our backs.”

“We dare not return home as we are still afraid of airstrikes,” she said. “I hope the situation will return to normal as soon as possible. I have never experienced such chaos in my lifetime.”

The woman said that the nearly 50,000 people who fled Kawlin are staying in areas “nearby the city” and that the armed resistance has been providing the displaced with some food and shelter.

However, the military has blocked routes to Kawlin, leaving those who fled without access to adequate amounts of food, medicine and fuel, residents said.

Aftermath of clashes

In the meantime, the armed resistance is working to solidify its control on the city and to push forward into nearby towns, a member of the Kawlin PDF told RFA.

“We are trying to maintain the city, which is an extremely difficult task,” said the PDF member, who also declined to be named. “We had to carry out many difficult missions to occupy the city. We retreated many times, but we took control of it in the end.”

The Kawlin PDF member said that he hopes his group’s success inspires other anti-junta forces to do the same in other parts of Sagaing, which has seen some of the fiercest fighting in all of Myanmar since the military seized power in a Feb. 1, 2021, coup d’etat.

Attempts by RFA to contact junta Deputy Information Minister Major General Zaw Min Tun and Sai Naing Naing Kyaw, the junta’s ethnic affairs minister and spokesperson for Sagaing region, for comment on the military’s loss of Kawlin went unanswered Tuesday. 

Than Soe Naing, a political commentator, called the seizure of Kawlin by the armed resistance forces “the first stage” of capturing other cities in Sagaing.

“The resistance forces in Sagaing region need arms and ammunition, rather than manpower,” he said. “If [they can] control more areas with sufficient arms and establish better collaborative efforts, we could see more success for the armed resistance in coming months.”

More than 1.6 million civilians have fled their homes due to fighting since the February 2021 coup, according to figures released by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) at the end of last month. The agency said that the number of displaced in Sagaing has reached at least 813,500.

RFA News

UNDER WHOSE COMMAND?

Human rights abuses under Myanmar’s military ruleA report by Security Force Monitor

For the first time, extensive research has mapped the Myanmar Army’s entire Chain of Command. The research details the hierarchy and control exercised by senior commanders over hundreds of units throughout a twelve year period. We now know the entire chain of command and can identify who was in command when each alleged human rights abuse occurred between 30 March 2011 and 30 March 2023.

Proving individual responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity is a complex task. This is especially true in Myanmar, where secrecy around the army’s structure has long hampered efforts for accountability.

Since 2011 more than 60% of the senior commanders of the Myanmar Army have had disappearances, killings, rape or torture allegedly committed by units under their command.

A decade of worsening human rights abuses

On 30 March 2011, Min Aung Hlaing became Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Myanmar, otherwise known as the Tatmadaw. The Myanmar Army is by far its largest and most powerful branch of the armed forces. Since Min Aung Hlaing took command of the military, the United Nations, human rights groups and others have accused the Myanmar Army of committing genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes across the country.

During the same period, Myanmar initially appeared to be on a path towards greater democracy and civic participation. That ended in February 2021. Led by Min Aung Hlaing, the army ousted the democratically-elected government, headed by the National League for Democracy party, in a coup d’état. Civilian protest was met with a wave of violence unleashed by the armed forces. Today, the army is accused of continuing to enact a brutal crackdown including arbitrary arrest, torture, enforced disappearances and mass killings.

A crowd of hundreds of thousands of protestors gather in the centre of Yangon to show their support for the Civil Disobedience Movement and to reject the coup.

The Security Force Monitor (SFM) is a project of the Columbia Law Human Rights Institute. Our new research lays bare the Chain of Command of the Myanmar Army and reveals how allegations against soldiers from low level units can be linked to senior army commanders.

Since 2011 more than 60% of the senior commanders of the Myanmar Army have had disappearances, killings, rape or torture allegedly committed by units under their command.

This research shines new light on the control exercised by senior army commanders over the conduct of individual army units. We hope it can be used to support efforts to deliver accountability for alleged crimes against humanity, war crimes committed by the Myanmar Army, and justice for those that have suffered at their hands.

Map of Myanmar

Military commanders take their positions in parliament. The Pyithu Hluttaw, or lower house of Myanmar’s parliament, is dominated by former soldiers, their positions guaranteed under a constitution which was ratified after a fraudulent referendum in 2008.

Methodology

Establishing the chain of command is one of the key elements in determining who should be held accountable for war crimes or crimes against humanity.

The Myanmar Army is one of the most secretive and opaque militaries in the world. Without a good understanding of the structure of the Myanmar Army, human rights groups have struggled to link alleged violations committed by low-level units to the generals in charge.

To build our research we relied on open source information drawn from the work of national and international human rights organizations and local activists. In doing so, we have been able to piece together the most comprehensive picture of the army’s operational structure to date.

Our sources include books, independent newspapers and the military’s own media outlets. We rigorously tracked what each of these sources reported about every unit and commander over the course of more than twelve years to build our picture of the army, piece by piece:

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For example a commander is identified in a single newspaper article. This establishes a single claim for the commander on the day the article was published.

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As we find more sources with claims about the commander at different points in time, we add them to the timeline.

We can now see a fuller timeline of the commander’s career.

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The secrecy around the Myanmar Army means there is a lot of conflicting information in the public domain. Every time we get a new source we analyze it against everything else in our dataset.

Sometimes sources might have competing claims about who is the commander of a unit.

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We can resolve the conflict and identify the accurate information by comparing sources about each person’s career, as well as data on similar commanders.

We used this basic cross referencing approach with our research on the chain of command, commanders, the areas under the commander’s control and all other aspects of our dataset.

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Map of Myanmar

Armed Forces Day. 15,000 soldiers paraded in an annual event that is recognised as the day the modern Burmese army was founded. Panos

Myanmar’s Army

The Myanmar Army has a dynamic structure that changes depending on where units are operating. Our research builds on this understanding to show how command flows from top to bottom.

At the top is the Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services, Min Aung Hlaing, who controls all branches of the military. Under him is Soe Win, simultaneously Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Defense Services and commander of the Myanmar Army. Both have held their positions since 30 March 2011.

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Below them is the Joint Chief of Staff who controls all aspects of the army, including the General Staff of the army and six Bureaus of Special Operations.

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Each Bureau of Special Operations controls at least one Regional Military Command (RMC).

The people that hold these positions are the senior commanders of the Myanmar Army sitting at the top of the army’s hierarchy.

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Below these senior commanders are units which carry out operations on the ground based on orders from these senior commanders.

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Two major formations that move around the country are Military Operations Commands (MOCs) and Light Infantry Divisions (LIDs). They fall under the control of the Regional Military Command responsible for the area where they are operating, but also report up to the army chief of staff. RMCs control any army units that enter into their territory.

All Regional Military Commands, Military Operations Commands and Light Infantry Divisions command Infantry and Light Infantry Battalions, which are the main combat unit of the Myanmar Army. This analysis is limited to connecting violations allegedly committed by MOCs and LIDs and these battalions to the wider chain of command.

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While this basic structure was known, the specific chain of command for each unit and how it may have changed through time was not. Our research has tracked the movements of every single unit, its command relationship in these three formations, and the careers of senior army commanders for an entire twelve year period.BATTALIONS(LIDS)100xBATTALIONS (MOCS)200xBATTALIONS (ROCS)36xBATTALIONS (RMCS)187xTACTICAL OPERATIONS COMMANDS (LIDS)30xTACTICAL OPERATIONS COMMANDS (MOCS)60xLIGHT INFANTRY DIVISIONS (LIDS)10xMILITARY OPERATIONS COMMANDS (MOCS)20x6xREGIONAL OPERATIONS COMMANDS (ROCS)4x41xTACTICAL OPERATIONS COMMANDS (RMCS)MILITARY REGIONS (YANGON RMCS)REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDS14xBASED ON AREAARMY CHIEF OF STAFFBUREAU OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS6xJOINT CHIEF OF STAFFTATMADAW-KYIARMYDEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEFOF DEFENCE SERVICESTATMADAWCOMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

Understanding this dynamic and changing structure enables us to reveal, for the first time, which senior commanders were in command for every alleged human rights abuse committed by an army unit.

Military and police beat a family arrested during a protest in Mandalay, Myanmar, in 2021.

Chain of Command

Take this example of allegation of arbitrary arrest and torture in April, 2011, shortly after Min Aung Hlaing became Commander-in-Chief of the military.

The allegation identifies that the 502 Light Infantry Battalion falls under the command of 1 Military Operations Command. Given the date and location more connections can be made to the wider army chain of command.

Sources before and after the alleged violation establish Northeastern Regional Command controls Kyaukme township and the chain of command up all the way to the top of the military.

Other sources from before and after the alleged violation identifies every commander in the chain of command ending with Min Aung Hlaing at the top.

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Map of Myanmar

Senior commanders in the Myanmar Army. From left to right: Mya Htun Oo, Soe Win, Min Aung Hlaing.

Linking Allegations

The vast majority of senior army commanders over a twelve year period can be linked through the chain of command to allegations of disappearances, killings, rapes and torture.

Most of these commanders were promoted to higher ranks after these alleged violations occurred.

Since Min Aung Hlaing became Commander-in-Chief of the Myanmar Army in 2011, the entire vast army apparatus was controlled by just 79 senior commanders.

Senior commanders can be held responsible for human rights abuses committed by their subordinates.

64% (51 of the 79) senior army commanders that have served under Min Aung Hlaing have had alleged disappearances, killings, rape or instances of torture committed by units under their command.

54% (28 of 51) of these commanders were promoted in rank after at least one alleged disappearance, killing, rape or instance of torture was committed by units under their command. The others could not be promoted in rank further (9), promotions could not be determined (11), or may be promoted in the future (3).

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Children, affected by clashes between the military and ethnic rebel groups, playing at the Kho Lone monastery, temporarily being used as a camp for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP), in Kutkai in Shan State. Local civil society organisations say more than 2,000 people have been displaced as residents caught in the middle seek safety in nearby monasteries.

Establishing patterns

With a full understanding of the Myanmar Army’s chain of command, we can now map allegations of abuse onto this structure to establish patterns.

Between 30 March 2011 and 30 March 2023, allegations of disappearances, killings, rape or torture have been made consistently against the same units – even when different people were in command.

Over those twelve years, senior army commanders served in multiple different positions.

Whenever commanders served along Myanmar’s borders they almost always had allegations against units under their command. However, when commanding units in major cities like Yangon or the capital Naypyidaw, especially before the 2021 coup, there were no reports of allegations against their subordinate units.

Mya Htun Oo’s career can serve as an example for this analysis. He served in five different positions in the army’s chain of command between 2011 and 2023.

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This chart highlights the positions that Mya Htun Oo held in the Myanmar Army between 30 March 2011 and 30 March 2023.

The other circles represent another person who commanded the same unit at some point during that time frame. For example, Eastern Central RMC had nine different commanders, including Mya Htun Oo.

For some positions subordinates units under Mya Htun Oo were accused of committing disappearances, killings, rapes or torture. During other commands there were no such allegations against subordinates.

The same is true for other senior commanders.

Four commanders of Eastern Central RMC, including Mya Htun Oo, had subordinates accused of committing disappearances, killings, rapes or torture during their command.

The other five other commanders of Eastern Central RMC did not have any of those allegations made against units under their control during their command of Eastern Central RMC.EASTERN CENTRAL REGIONALMILITARY COMMAND5 BUREAU OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS6 BUREAU OF SPECIAL OPERATIONSGENERAL ARMY STAFFJOINT CHIEF OF STAFF

This chart shows, for the first time, every position held by every senior commander and whether disappearances, killings, rape or instances of torture were allegedly committed by units under their command for that position.

In many areas of the country, almost every single person who ever held command had disappearances, killings, rape or instances of torture allegedly committed by units under their command.

This is particularly true in areas of long-standing conflict and concern for human rights abuses: Kachin state controlled by Northern RMC, Kayin state controlled by Southeastern RMC, and Shan state divided among Northern, Eastern Central, Eastern, Northeastern, and Triangle RMCs.NAYPYIDAW REGIONALMILITARY COMMANDYANGON REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDSOUTHEASTERN REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDCOASTAL REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDSOUTHERN REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDSOUTHWESTERN REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDWESTERN REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDEASTERN CENTRAL REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDEASTERN REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDNORTHEASTERN REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDTRIANGLE REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDCENTRAL REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDNORTHERN REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDNORTHWESTERN REGIONAL MILITARY COMMANDGENERAL ARMY STAFF6 BUREAU OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS5 BUREAU OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS4 BUREAU OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS3 BUREAU OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS2 BUREAU OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS1 BUREAU OF SPECIAL OPERATIONSJOINT CHIEF OF STAFFTATMADAW-KYIARMYDEPUTY COMMANDER-IN-CHIEFTATMADAW COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF

This report

Our research is ongoing. We are continually adding to our dataset. The facts and statistics in this report were last updated on 11/1/2023

As noted throughout the text, this analysis is limited to particular allegations against specific units. This analysis does not include allegations where no specific unit is identified. A future analysis will include these types of allegations. The analysis does not include allegations against artillery, armored or support units of the army, as the chain of command research for these units is ongoing.

For the most up to date information, please get in touch.

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You can search the chain of command in Myanmar for yourself.

Explore the connections through the chain of command from alleged violations up to senior commanders in our Data Explorer.

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Learn more about how we did this research

Go to the About section to learn more about specific areas of Security Force Monitor’s methodology in researching the Myanmar Army.

Sources