ND Burma
ND-Burma formed in 2004 in order to provide a way for Burma human rights organizations to collaborate on the human rights documentation process. The 13 ND-Burma member organizations seek to collectively use the truth of what communities in Burma have endured to advocate for justice for victims. ND-Burma trains local organizations in human rights documentation; coordinates members’ input into a common database using Martus, a secure open-source software; and engages in joint-advocacy campaigns.
Recent Posts
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- Myanmar’s junta cuts filmmaker’s life sentence to 15 years as part of wider amnesty
- Close The Sky
- International condemnation of the escalating humanitarian crisis and rights violations in Myanmar
- Women in Karenni State face increasing levels of violence
International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 26 June 2017
/in Press Releases and StatementsInternational Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 26 June 2017
Ending Torture, Addressing the Needs of Survivors
is Key to Building Peace and Democracy
Network for Human Rights Documentation-Burma (ND-Burma), the Assistance Association of Political Prisoners (AAPP), Women’s League of Burma (WLB), the Vimutti Women’s Organization (VWO) and Asia Justice and Rights (AJAR) are calling for an end to torture, and for rehabilitation of torture survivors.
ND-Burma, AAPP, WLB, VWO and AJAR are jointly organising a public event in Yangon (14:00-16:00 at Royal Rose Restaurant, Shwegondine, Bahan, Yangon) to mark the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture. At the event torture survivors, and civil society organizations working with them, will share about their experiences and what can be done to assist victims of torture. The Burmese language version of the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) will also be launched by AAPP at the event.
Torture is not a practice of the past; it continues to be used in Myanmar by State and non-State actors. The rise in reports of torture in ethnic areas affected by current conflicts is especially troubling. Torture is still used during detention and interrogation, often in an effort to procure information or to force confessions. Villagers suspected of being affiliated with ethnic armed groups are frequently captured by military and tortured indiscriminately. Torture also includes acts of sexual violence. It is the government’s responsibility to stop and prevent torture in its jurisdiction.
The government must ratify the United Nations Convention Against Torture, and other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT). It would be an important first step in eradicating torture in Myanmar. It would also be a symbolic pledge of solidarity with survivors.
Torture survivors have a right to reparations and support. Many face ongoing and serious health problems, which can lead to early and untimely death for some victims. Access to health care is an urgent need. Other needs include psychosocial support, vocational training, and public acknowledgement. Reparations and addressing the needs of torture survivors must be priorities of the government. They should be items for discussion in parliament and must be included in current peace process discussions.
In order to demonstrate its commitment to eliminating the practice of torture, we call on the government of Myanmar to implement the following recommendations:
We call on government and all non-State actor groups to stop practicing torture in any form.
Yangon, 26 June 2017
ND-Burma, AAPP, WLB, VWand AJAR
Contact persons:
About ND-Burma www.nd-burma.org
ND-Burma formed in 2004 in order to provide a way for Burma human rights organizations to collaborate on the human rights documentation process. Seven member organizations and nine affiliate organizations seek to collectively use the truth of what communities in Burma have endured to challenge the regime’s power through present-day advocacy as well as prepare for justice and accountability measures in a potential transition. ND-Burma conducts fieldwork trainings; coordinates members’ input into a common database using Martus, open-source software developed by Benetech; and engages in joint-advocacy campaigns. When possible, ND-Burma also collaborates with other human rights organizations in all aspects of its work.
About Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) www.aappb.org
AAPP was founded in 2000 by former political prisoners living in exile on the Thai/Burma border. Since then, the organization has been run by former political prisoners, and has opened offices inside Myanmar in Rangoon and Mandalay. AAPP advocates and lobbies for the release of remaining political prisoners and for the improvement of the lives of political prisoners after their release. The various assistance programs for political prisoners and their family members are aimed at ensuring they have access to education, vocational trainings, mental health counseling and healthcare.
About Vimutti Women’s Organization (VWO)
Vimutti Women’s Organization (VWO) is a community-based organization, which was created in 2009. Vimutti is a Pali word (Myanmar ancient literature), which means “freedom”. All VWO members are socially minded volunteers. VWO is very active in communities doing social work, humanitarian support, and providing educational charity to children from poverty-stricken families. VWO is directly engaging with vulnerable people to create a healthy societal environment through research, advocacy, networking, and improving their collective capacity development. VWO has a special program for strengthening women former political prisoners.
About Women’s League of Burma (WLB) www.womenofburma.org
The Women’s League of Burma (WLB) is an umbrella organization comprised of 13 women’s organizations of different ethnic backgrounds from Burma. WLB was founded on 9th December 1999. Its mission is to work for women’s empowerment and advancement of the status of women, and to work for the increased participation of women in all spheres of society in the democracy movement, and in peace and national reconciliation process through capacity building, advocacy, research and documentation.
About Asia Justice And Rights (AJAR) www.asia-ajar.org
AJAR is a regional human rights organization based in Jakarta. AJAR works to increase the capacity of local and national organization in the fight against entrenched impunity and to contribute to building cultures based on accountability, justice and a willingness to learn from the root causes of mass human rights violations in Asia Pacific region.
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Invitation Letter for International Day in Support of Victims of Torture
/in NewsInternational Day in Support of Victims of Torture
We would like to cordially invites you to join the International Day in Support of Victims of Torture organized by VWO, AJAR, APPA, ND-Burma and WLB.
The event will held at the Royal Rose Restaurant, 221 Shwegondine, Yangon, from 02: 00 PM to 04:00 PM on 26.6.207.
We will distribute the Burmese version of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. We will have penal discussion and performance by the survivors of torture.
Note – We would like to request you all bring your translator as the event will be conducted in Burmese.
Place – Royal Rose Restaurant, Shwe Gontai, Yangon
Date – 26.6.2017
Time – 02:00 PM to 04:00 PM
3rd Reparation Workshop
/in Photo newsYangon
Organized by
Asia Justice and Rights
and
Network for Human Rights Documentation Burma
ND-Burma launches Justice newsletter
/in Justice NewslettersSign up to ND-Burma’s new monthly justice newsletter:
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Seeking justice in Burma
Please find below ND-Burma’s new monthly newsletter compiling all developments on recognition and redress for human rights violations in Burma.
ND-Burma publishes briefing urging Government to discuss justice at 21st Century Panglong
On 22 May ND-Burma published the briefing ‘Without Justice there can be no Peace’, which outlined its 13 member organizations’ hopes, expectations and criticisms of the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference. The briefing called on the Government to:
28 Burmese expatriates to regain citizenship
The Government confirmed that 28 Burmese expatriates who had lost their citizenship after applying for foreign passports or residency will have it re-instated. Dual citizenship is prohibited under Burma’s 1982 Citizenship Law and tens of thousands of Burmese exiles who fled the military regime lost their citizenship after applying for legal status in their host countries. This included thousands of political activists and human rights defenders, many of whom have had their citizenship re-instated by a committee set up under the Thein Sein Government.
However, several activists – including some ND-Burma members – have submitted applications which have yet to be approved by the committee. According to the Government, of the 55 people who submitted applications under the new government, 33 have yet to be reviewed.
The restitution of citizenship is an important development in transitional justice as it shows the Government recognizes the need to restore full civil rights to those who lost them for political reasons.
U Win Tin clinic almost shuts due to funding issues;
Former political prisoners call for transitional justice
The U Win Tin clinic in Yangon, which provides free medical services to former political prisoners, was close to being shuttered due to funding issues. Despite reports it had temporarily closed, its Director U Htin Aung told ND-Burma it had managed to stay open in order to care for the 900 regular patients it sees, despite not having sufficient medication. Since its inception in 2012, the clinic has cared for thousands of former political prisoners and their families, who receive no financial or medical assistance from the Government.
ND-Burma partner organization, the Former Political Prisoners Society (FPPS), has noted that political prisoners often work as de-facto social workers, providing services such as health care and psychological assistance that should be provided by the Government. FPPS urged the Government to allow political prisoners to use their experience and expertise to contribute to state building instead of just pro-bono service provision.
In an opinion piece for weekly Frontier Myanmar former political prisoner Khin Zaw Win argued that ‘a reckoning looms on human rights,’ and called on the Government to allow truth seeking in order to build a system that respects the rule of law.
Specialist on ethnic politics calls for discussion on transitional justice
Dr. Ashley South, who is a Research Fellow at the Center for Ethnic Studies at Chiang Mai University, said in an interview with JusticeInfo.net that there was a “striking lack of discussion on transitional justice” in Burma. He ascribed this to the fact that initial discussion about holding the military account, which were taking place around 1988-89, ended after the military aborted any moves towards transition following the 1990 election. “There are certainly many traumatised individuals, families and communities who have suffered greatly. I am sure that among these diverse communities there is strong demand [for transitional justice],” he said.
“Without Justice there can be no Peace”
/in Press Releases and Statements[wpdm_package id=’2518′]
“Without Justice there can be no Peace”
Civil society expectations from the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference
Today the Government will host the second session of the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference in Naypyidaw. As civil society organizations (CSOs) have been barred from the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC)-led political discussions between the Government, Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), ND-Burma has put together a summary of its 14 member organizations’ hopes, expectations and criticisms of the peace process. Our members’ key recommendations are as follows:
● Include all ethnic armed organizations in the political dialogue in order to make Panglong all-inclusive.
● Include civil society organizations in the political dialogue to benefit from their local expertise and community trust.
● Ensure any final peace deal commits to remove the Tatmadaw’s immunity clause from the 2008 Constitution in order to end impunity.
● Ensure any peace deal includes language acknowledging that human rights violations have been committed by all sides and that the Government will need to provide redress for victims.
“We welcome the efforts for peace. But as long as Panglong is not inclusive, peace is very far”
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners
Each of ND-Burma’s members said that they welcomed the peace process and stressed their desire for it to succeed. However, member organizations also argued that lasting peace could not be found under the current architecture of Panglong due to its lack of ‘inclusivity’. This was in reference to the Government’s exclusion of EAOs that have not signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), as well as civil society, from the core political negotiations of Panglong.
All members called on the Government to include all EAOs in the UPDJC-led political discussions, regardless of whether they have signed the NCA or not. Currently, nonsignatory EAOs have been invited as ‘special guests’ to Panglong, allowing them to submit papers to the and attend ceremonial meetings. At the time of writing the Northern Alliance of seven EAOs had decided to take up the invitation and attend as ‘special guests’, whereas the seven members of the United Nationalities Federal Council(UNFC) had not. These two groups of non-signatories account for 80% of rebel troops in Burma.
Members also highlighted the fruitlessness of peace talks if heavy fighting continues in northern Burma. The Kachin Women’s Association of Thailand (KWAT) in particular criticized the Tatmadaw’s ramping up of offensives against Northern Alliance member EAOs in advance of the Panglong conference. KWAT General Secretary Moon Nay Lin called this a “callous policy designed to pressure non-signatories into signing the NCA.”
Members also criticized the fact that non-signatory EAOs have not been permitted to hold national level political dialogues. Angshuman Choudhury of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies has highlighted the deadlock this can create as certain EAOs do not wish to sign the NCA without consulting their ethnic support base.1 The KWAT has echoed this sentiment and urged the Government to respect EAOs as representatives of Burma’s ethnic nationalities, regardless of whether they have signed the NCA or not.
The All Arakan Students’ and Youths’ Congress (AASYC) also criticized the fact that national level political dialogue in Arakan State had been blocked by the Government, citing ‘sensitivities’ in the region. The AASYC said that this was a violation of the NCA as it prevented the signatory Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) from holding a national level political dialogue, while also preventing the Arakanese people from submitting their voices to the peace process.
“Panglong will never build lasting peace if it is just negotiations between those who hold guns”
Tavoyan Women’s Union
Our members also lamented the fact that civil society is only allowed to participate in peace talks through the Civil Society Forum, which is held in parallel to Panglong but limited to discussion on taxes, the environment, and religious affairs. Security and political issues are off the table.
This is despite the fact that CSOs, including the majority of ND-Burma members, are often deeply embedded in conflict-affected communities, providing civilians with humanitarian assistance and essential services. These organizations have both expertise and the trust of their communities. For example, the Palaung Women’s Organization operates a mobile medical clinic for those in remote locations without adequate healthcare, the Tavoyan Women’s Union provides reproductive health training to those who do not have access to it, and the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) provides education to ex-convicts.
Without grassroots involvement in the peace process, there is a danger that the negotiations will be seen as an elite power game between the Government and those who hold arms. Harn Yawnghwe, who heads the Euro Burma Office and has been heavily involved in the peace process, has argued that the lack of CSO and general public involvement in the peace process may help achieve some measure of progress in the short-term but will backfire in the end.
“When it comes to adopting the changes agreed in the peace process into the Constitution I believe people may vote no as they will not feel like they have ownership over what has been agreed,” says Mr. Yawnghwe.2 The Tavoyan Women’s Union summarised it as follows: “We fully support the spirit of Panglong, but it will never build lasting peace if it is just negotiations between those who hold guns.”
Indeed, academic research has consistently shown that the inclusion of civil society in peace-making helps achieve peace deals that last. One study showed that CSO involvement in a peace process reduced the risk of a return to violence by up to 64 percent.
“The 2008 Constitution only provides protection to the military. Panglong is our platform for changing that” Tavoyan Women’s Union
Our members unanimously agreed that lasting peace could not be found as long as Burma was under the 2008 Constitution and each organization saw Panglong as a forum in which constitutional amendments would be negotiated. However, members voiced their concerns over the fact that the Government and Tatmadaw were insisting on a finalized peace deal before any changes to the Constitution could be made.
Though previously campaigning for constitutional change and saying that a democratic transition without under the current charter was mere “window-dressing”, the NLD leadership now also insists the country must see national reconciliation before the Constitution is modified.4 The NLD Speaker of the House stated this explicitly last June and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi echoed his remarks during a recent visit to London.
ND-Burma’s members have pointed out that the current Constitution makes no mention of federalism or self-determination for Burma’s states, which results in a lack of trust from ethnic nationalities, who fear discussions at Panglong may be cosmetic. Indeed, the KWAT voiced its concern that the Government was using the Panglong name for political purposes without respecting the spirit of the original agreement, which enshrined “full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas.”
A recent Government decision to allow ethnic states and regions draft their own constitutions was cautiously welcomed by members, who anticipated that this would enable previously excluded civil society voices to provide valuable input. However, member also criticized the fact that states’ charters were in no way permitted to challenge the 2008 Constitution. The AASYC said: “We are concerned that while Burma is under the 2008 Constitution it will be impossible for states to draft constitutions based on genuine federal principles which guarantee their right to political selfdetermination – including the all-important right to control natural resources.”
Members also highlighted the fact that trust would be impossible as long as the Tatmadaw was guaranteed total autonomy over its affairs, including legal immunity.5 Moon Nay Lin from the KWAT said: “The Tatmadaw has long used the immunity clause in the Constitution to commit grave human rights violations with impunity, with the most systematic abuses occurring in ethnic nationality areas. As long as this clause is not removed from the Constitution, we can have no trust that these violations will not continue.”
“Without justice there can be no peace”
Kachin Women’s Association of Thailand
ND-Burma’s members unanimously agreed that lasting peace could not be achieved without all those in positions of power and trust acknowledging and providing redress for systematic human rights abuses. Members highlighted the fact that without recognition of the abuses that have been committed, people had no guarantees that the violations would not recur and trust would be impossible as a result. As any peace agreement reached would serve as the basis for changes to the Constitution, members said that they would continue to push for language relating to recognition and redress in any peace deal.
Our members also argued that institutional reform was key to stitching together a durable peace deal. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) argued that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) on the side of EAOs – what
Burma expert Bertil Lintner has dubbed “unconditional surrender” – had to happen alongside security sector reform (SSR) on the Government’s side.6 Only through institutional reform would it be possible to begin to re-build trust following decades of systematic abuse by security forces in Burma.
Providing victims with redress also makes economic sense: research has shown that implementing post-conflict justice mechanisms can increase the amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) a country receives, as it signals a concrete commitment to peace.7 A recent slowdown in foreign investment in Burma must at least partially be attributed to the re-escalation of conflict in a number of areas and the Government’s refusal to discuss transitional justice.
“We need to be farsighted, courageous enough to take risks in the interest of the generations to come”
In her speech commemorating 70 years since her father’s first attempt at peace, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said that to succeed, “we need to be farsighted, courageous enough to take risks in the interest of the generations to come.” Acknowledging the horrific abuses that have been perpetrated by all those holding guns in Burma will take great courage indeed, but it is the only way lasting peace can be found.
About ND-Burma
ND-Burma is a 14-member organization whose members represent a range of ethnic nationalities, women and the LGBTI community. We have been documenting human rights abuses and fighting for justice for victims since 2004. 1. Assistance Association for Political Prisoners – Burma
2. Burma Issues
3. Human Rights Foundation of Monland
4. Kachin Women’s Association – Thailand
5. Kachin Development Networking Group
6. Palaung Women’s Organization
7. Ta’ang Students and Youth Organization
8. Tavoyan Women’s Union
Affiliate Members
1. All Arakan Students’ and Youths’ Congress
2. Chin Human Rights Organization
3. EarthRights International
4. Equality Myanmar
5. Lahu Women’s Organization
6. Pao Youth Organization
The Place of Reconciliation in Transitional Justice
/in NewsDownload the briefing paper here.
Reconciliation is a complex set of processes that involve building or rebuilding relationships, often in the aftermath of massive and widespread human rights violations.
It can occur at the individual, interpersonal, socio-political, and institutional levels and be described as “thin” if it is based on coexistence with little or no trust, respect,
and shared values, or “thick” if it is based on the restoration of dignity, reversing structural causes of marginalization and discrimination, and restoring victims to their
position as rights bearers and citizens.
Despite its complexity and contingency, reconciliation does occur in societies left fractured by conflict or repression, with transitional justice processes capable of contributing
to it through their outcomes and processes of discourse and participation. Context is a critical factor shaping reconciliation processes and their aims: fragile settings
may emphasize resilience; conflict settings may emphasize peaceful coexistence; and massive displacement settings may emphasize return and reintegration. Different
types of reconciliation can occur to varying degrees, alone or in combination.
What are the different types of reconciliation?
Individual Reconciliation: In order to rebuild their lives and their relationships with others, victims may have to reconcile themselves with their past experiences, including the harms, suffering, and damage that have resulted from human rights violations. While this is a conception of reconciliation that is often overlooked, it emerges frequently in work with victims.
Interpersonal Reconciliation: Often focusing on the relationship between victims, perpetrators, or beneficiaries of rights violations, interpersonal reconciliation can involve processes based on acknowledgement of past wrongs, reform, and forgiveness between individuals. This type may draw on religious understandings of reconciliation.
Socio-political Reconciliation: Socio-political reconciliation focuses on relations between groups—social, political, ethnic, religious, or other—in divided societies. In contexts where existing parliamentary and other structures may be relatively strong, processes may lead to respect for others who hold different beliefs and to a commitment to resolve differences through agreed-on, non-violent means. In other contexts, where society has no political history of strong institutions, agreements can commit to acknowledgment of harms done and respect for others the future.
Institutional reconciliation: Institutional reconciliation is premised on processes whereby institutions charged with protecting fundamental freedoms and individual and collective rights win back the trust of alienated parts of society. It is often focused on justice and security institutions but can also affect institutions such as education and the media. It is relevant not only where there are relatively strong state institutions, but also where those institutions have significantly breached the public trust by committing, facilitating, or allowing massive violations.
To what degree can reconciliation be established?
Relationships can be built or rebuilt in different ways and to different degrees. This is often discussed in terms of “thin” or “thick” reconciliation, although the distinction is not always clear cut. Furthermore, reconciliation can play out on the vertical and horizontal axes to smaller or greater degrees.
Restoring dignity in this sense may require processes aimed at countering negative attitudes, restoring those who suffered violations to their proper position as rights bearers and citizens, and reversing or reducing the structural causes of marginalization and discrimination. It takes seriously the social and economic harms that have been caused by violations and taking steps to remedy them.
How does context affect reconciliation?
As with transitional justice generally, context determines to a large extent what reconciliation means, what relationships need to be restored, and how much progress can be made.
Religious and other beliefs
In South Africa, the discourse of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission emphasized largely a religious conception of reconciliation. It also invoked the notion of Ubuntu, an ethical approach that emphasizes common humanity in order to promote broader concepts of healing and harmony. In Chile, the transition was more about the need to overcome societal divisions between the political left and right, and respect the rule of law, and protection of human rights.
Restoring trust
In Argentina, the emphasis was less on fostering respect for different political beliefs and more on restoring trust in state institutions and the demonstration of their efficacy in protecting human rights. In particular, there was a need to restore the military as an institution to its place in the democratic order and in reestablishing the rule of law over state terror.
Fragile states
In contexts of fragility, where institutions are weak and resources scarce, a development lens may emphasize the importance of reconciliation for notions of resilience—the capacity to absorb, recover from, and resist shocks and crises, including systemic rights violations. Resilience in peacebuilding contexts is seen to include psychosocial recovery, social cohesion, and inclusive governance; development practitioners connect more resilient societies with levels of reconciliation and trust.
Conflict-affected states
In contexts of conflict-affected states, a security lens may emphasize the importance of reconciliation for peaceful coexistence. The dynamics of armed conflicts can be more complex than those of authoritarianism, particularly in terms of the range of non-state armed actors involved, the cross-border movement of combatants, and the scale and nature of violations committed. Reconciliation is likely to involve the reintegration of ex-combatants into their communities, often through local or traditional practices.
Large-scale displacement
In contexts of large-scale displacement, which are very often those of fragile and conflict-affected states, the notion of return may emphasize the importance of reconciliation for their reintegration. Reintegration may depend on reconciliation between returnees and state institutions, which failed to protect them, as well as between returnees and those who remained in their communities for the duration of the conflict. The restoration of dignity may require specific measures, such as the restitution of land and property, and addressing any psychosocial or socioeconomic damage done.
Are reconciliation and justice compatible?
While processes of transitional justice and reconciliation may interact, the two notions should not be conflated. Reconciliation as an outcome is only one of the potential objectives of transitional justice, and its relevance depends on each context.
To the extent that transitional justice processes succeed in recognizing victims, restoring trust in the state and one’s fellow citizens, and preventing future violations, they may positively contribute to vertical and/or horizontal reconciliation in different contexts.
In Argentina, the prosecution of the military leadership and the reparations program implemented for victims were important in restoring trust in the institutions of democracy and in placing the military in its rightful place in that context. In Chile and South Africa, a great deal of weight was placed on making the truth known about what had happened, why, and which institutions were responsible through their truth and reconciliation commissions.
Potentially more important for reconciliation than the results of specific mechanisms, however, are the processes through which those mechanisms come about—the discourse in which they are discussed, the decisions through which they are shaped, and their participatory nature.
Processes, therefore, embrace consultation, media relations, gender sensitivity, political alignment, and broad civil society engagement. The case of transitional justice fostering divisions, if seen as lacking legitimacy or impartiality, is likely if it is inappropriate for the context or without participation and transparency. Reconciliation may have negative connotations if it is promoted by actors as the only possible outcome, as a substitute for accountability and recognition, or as a synonym for criminal justice.
Where are some recent examples of transitional justice and reconciliation?
Morocco, 1990s to Present
After decades of abuses committed by the government, Morocco began to undertake a multi-stage political reform process in the country. This process, through which reconciliation became part of the public discourse, included granting amnesty to political prisoners and the return of the forcibly disappeared; creating an arbitration body to grant reparations to victims; and establishing the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER).
A number of different measures have contributed to reform, including: individual and community reparations; history and memory initiatives; addressing structural issues that led to prior violations; and the re-establishment of trust between citizens and the state. Reconciliation in Morocco at one level has involved a socio-political process, through the creation of a political community based on democratic values. Contributing to this was the acknowledgement of the country’s social and cultural diversity in formal processes. At another level, reconciliation has involved reestablishing trust between citizen and state institutions, further emphasized by civil society activism.
Tunisia, 2011 to Present
Since the overthrow of the previous government, Tunisia’s transition has focused on addressing the Ben-Ali regime’s legacies of abuse and corruption while preventing their recurrence. This has included passing a Transitional Justice Law in 2013, which established a Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC) to examine and report on past abuses and the Specialized Judicial Chambers to pursue criminal accountability. While a lack of understanding of reconciliation still exists, it is understood in terms of personal and collective dignity, political recognition and reform, economic justice, equality, social stability, and restoring victims’ rights.
Discourse in Tunisian society involves the idea accountability should prelude reconciliation, and the relationship between the state and citizens should be reformed through the judiciary. There are also strong beliefs that reconciliation will require the recognition of long-term social exclusion and regional inequality through advocacy of civil society and the continued transitional justice process.
Syria, 2011 to Present
Syria presents an extremely challenging context for reconciliation processes because of ongoing conflict, atrocities, and almost half of the country’s population is displaced. Steps should be taken now to ensure the participation of displaced persons and other victims in discussions about return and reconciliation upon a political settlement being reached. The priorities among refugees for a return process include security, the assurance of basic needs, access to government services, psychosocial support and family reunification. Significant divisions have emerged and the make-up of Syrian society, as well as divisions between those who left and those who remain, will make progress toward reconciliation complicated.
The term coexistence is more common than reconciliation, referring to re-establishing social ties, and is seen as an obligation. Dignity is another term used by many refugees, which is related to reconciliation, because loss of dignity is viewed as one of the most significant harms of the displacement experience. Many seek tribal justice mechanisms because of mistrust of national and international judicial systems. Interviews with refugees and civil society actors highlight the harms and losses experienced by Syrians, both individually and collectively.