Weekly Update on the Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar Post-Coup (August 2-8)2021

Myanmar civilians reject the junta and their illegal seizure of power. Attempts to legitimize themselves through the newly established ‘caretaker government’ have not fooled anyone. Protests continue, especially on 8-8-88 to mark long standing calls for democracy. More in our weekly update

Myanmar Needs ‘People First’ Assistance

By AUNG MYO MIN 5 August 2021

The people of Myanmar face an unparalleled national three Cs (coup, COVID and climate change) crisis today as we confront a failed military coup, catastrophic third COVID-19 wave, and natural disasters engineered by changes in the climate.  As the third wave of COVID-19 spreads rampantly throughout Myanmar, it is possible that the next COVID-19 variant could arise out of Myanmar; this is a major threat to regional and global public health security, a threat that must be immediately addressed by ASEAN and Myanmar’s neighboring countries as well as the international community.

For six months, the military junta has robbed the people of Myanmar of their sense of security and dignity. The military has murdered 940 people, including over 70 children as young as 6 years old. They have arbitrarily detained over 5,400 people. Of those, 19 percent are women who have been at the forefront of leading anti-junta protests on the streets. The Ministry of Women, Youths and Children’s Affairs has reported rape and sexual violence against girls and women in detention. Along with peaceful LGBTIQ protesters, they have been sexually assaulted and harassed, made to conduct humiliating and degrading acts that amount to torture in detention.

Meanwhile, food insecurity is growing, the banking sector is in crisis, and the economy is collapsing with the World Bank forecasting Myanmar’s economy to shrink by 18 percent, and the World Food Program estimating that an additional 3.4 million people will now go hungry. This adds to the decades of military rule, and the mismanagement of essential administration, including in the health sector. Instead of funding education and health, the military focused on stealing wealth from the people of Myanmar to fund their decades-long civil war against ethnic communities, committing war crimes and crimes against humanity in ethnic areas and genocide against the Rohingya with impunity. As a result, more than half a million people are now internally displaced in Myanmar. This is the reason why Myanmar requires such dire levels of international assistance today.

In the face of these challenges, the people of Myanmar, and the National Unity Government (NUG) have repeatedly called on ASEAN and the international community for rapid and expanded humanitarian aid intervention. We welcome the generous support that has been provided by the regional and international community in response to the humanitarian crisis so far, particularly in dialogue with the NUG and NUG-aligned administrative bodies, as well as civil society organizations (CSOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs), but the needs are far greater and require a more robust and coordinated intervention.

Responsibility for this human rights and humanitarian crisis rests squarely with the military junta, which, rather than tackling these issues to the benefit of the people of Myanmar, continues to weaponize COVID-19 and humanitarian aid for its own political gain.

It is vital that humanitarian assistance programs be designed and implemented in a way that ensures that they are not being used to promote or benefit the political or financial interests of the military junta.

ASEAN and the wider international community must coordinate with and empower existing governance structures that are supported by the people in all parts of Myanmar, particularly through NUG-aligned administrative bodies and CSOs/CBOs in ethnic-administered areas for localized humanitarian response to needs on the ground.

The NUG’s people-centered response to humanitarian aid prioritizes the immediate needs of the people of Myanmar. The “People First” approach places the people’s well-being and health services as our first priority, as we endeavor to work with all UN agencies and development partners to bring equitable access to healthcare and COVID-19 vaccination for all people of Myanmar in accordance with international standards, including those laid out by the WHO and UNICEF.

We urge ASEAN, and its humanitarian assistance through the AHA Center, to adhere to certain principles in provision of humanitarian aid. While the people in Myanmar are in desperate need of assistance, support must reach those most in need in a way that does not legitimize the junta, which is the cause of the people’s suffering.

While recognizing that communication with the military may be unavoidable in some instances in providing humanitarian aid, all ASEAN, UN and international partners are strongly urged to avoid communications with the military junta, which will imply or provide it with legitimacy or recognition. To this end, we strongly urge ASEAN to have regular, meaningful and inclusive dialogue with all stakeholders as set out in its five point consensus, in particular by holding dialogue with the NUG and members of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) as well as ethnic armed organizations.

It is crucial that resources be provided directly to local actors who can flexibly and creatively meet the needs on the ground in a way that does not legitimize or otherwise support the military junta. By resourcing CSOs, CBOs, ethnic administrations, and in some circumstances services through CDM health professionals, ASEAN and international support can meet the needs of the people without causing greater harm. This can also ensure that COVID-19 support and vaccinations are not used as a weapon against the people and those participating in the CDM.

Commitment to providing cross-border assistance is key to meeting the urgent needs of the people of Myanmar. Cross-border aid can be delivered through CSOs and CBOs with decades of experience in provision of essential services, particularly in ethnic administrations. The COVID-19 Task Force set up by the Ministry of Health, NUG and ethnic health organizations is central to such provision of assistance at this time.

Decentralized and localized aid is reflective of the emerging federal democratic union that we aspire to build and cross-border aid is currently essential in the realization of inclusive and equitable provision of aid.

These above positions of the NUG in regards to humanitarian aid are clearly laid out in the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management position paper issued on June 19. On July 18, reiterating these calls, the NUG sent a letter to the UN Secretary General, requesting a robust and well-designed intervention from the international community.

Every day that passes without ASEAN and the international community’s urgent action is a day that we lose more lives. The military exists to serve its own interests and has demonstrated over the past six months that it will not act in the best interest of the people of Myanmar. Rather, it serves to perpetuate its own status quo, which will only be further emboldened by the inaction of ASEAN and the wider international community.

The attempted coup has failed. It is the people of Myanmar, despite the immense challenges and against all odds, who are keeping the future of Myanmar from falling into decades-long military rule once again. But we require immediate support.

ASEAN must act, and it must act NOW. Not only for the sake of the people of Myanmar but for the sake of ASEAN. Their continuing insistence on working through the junta is an affront to its own founding Charter, with its declaration of “adhering to the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms”.

History is repeating itself once again. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing is an aspiring dictator, a third-generation military chief who is following in the footsteps of previous dictators, appointing himself as the “caretaker” of Myanmar. This is a threat to global stability and security, and while ASEAN has an important role to play, the world must no longer wait for ASEAN to act. The current human rights, humanitarian and COVID crisis requires robust and immediate action by the UN Secretary General and the UN Security Council. Their immediate action is needed to save lives.

Aung Myo Min is Minister of Human Rights in the National Unity Government of Myanmar.

Irrawaddy News

Myanmar human rights crisis needs solidarity-based approach

The people of Myanmar are facing a humanitarian catastrophe, with large-scale suffering caused by violence and displacement, an economic and food security crisis, and a public health emergency within which a deadly new wave of Covid-19 is wreaking havoc.

Myanmar is in dire need of humanitarian aid. But this aid needs to be politically sensitive.

It is essential to “frame” Myanmar’s current humanitarian crisis as a political and human rights crisis. Indeed – as highlighted by Professor Hugo Slim, a specialist in the ethics of war and humanitarianism – Myanmar is facing a political emergency in which a civil resistance movement is legitimately opposing a violent regime.

Myanmar has a long history of conflict between the Tatmadaw (armed forces) and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) struggling for self-determination in border areas. But if international actors frame the whole of the situation in Myanmar as the result of conflict (or, worse, “ethnic conflict”), it makes it far too easy for the military-run State Administration Council to deny any responsibility.

Instead, what is needed is recognition that, first, the humanitarian crisis cannot be isolated from what is a human-rights crisis driven by a military bent on terrorizing local populations to retain power; and, second, that deeply embedded structural violence and injustices lie at the root of Myanmar’s decades-long conflicts.

“Framing” the crisis in Myanmar as a political and human-rights crisis is obviously important from a moral perspective. It is also essential for the development of humanitarian programs.

Indeed, any humanitarian intervention in a political crisis will inevitably have political impacts. And any intervention in a conflict situation “will inevitably have an impact on the peace and conflict environment – positive or negative, direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional.”

The decisions that international donors and aid organizations make in Myanmar therefore carry heavy consequences.

The military has already blocked the delivery of humanitarian aid in many ethnic areas, as well as deliberately destroying food and medical supplies, diverting aid away from its intended recipients, and attacking aid workers. These acts constitute violations of international humanitarian law.

Myanmar soldiers on the march amid an anti-coup protest. Image: Getty via AFP / Hkun Lat
There are also major political and ethical implications in maintaining any kind of relationship that might signal international recognition of the State Administration Council.

For one – and even if this is not the intention of the agencies involved – international aid could legitimize a regime that is committing widespread and systematic attacks against the Myanmar people, which amount to crimes against humanity.

Second, if international agencies are seen as “siding” with the State Administration Council, this may sow distrust among local populations who overwhelmingly oppose the coup.

Third, this could create major tensions within aid agencies themselves – with many local staff opposing the State Administration Council.

In Myanmar’s political minefield, no matter how much international actors claim to be neutral, how they channel aid will not be perceived as neutral. Attempts at neutrality can also do real harm, particularly if – by not taking a stand or by having their aid politicized by the military regime – international actors end up emboldening and enabling those behind Myanmar’s human-rights crisis.

At the same time, as Hugo Slim highlights, “neutral humanitarian action is one version of humanitarianism – not the only version” – and it is not necessary to be neutral to be a good humanitarian.

The debate about humanitarian neutrality is far from new in Myanmar, with neutrality having been used in the past to justify shifts in international aid.

In the 1990s and 2000s, when Myanmar was under military rule, international donors provided aid in ways that in essence bypassed the junta – either by funding international non-governmental organizations or UN agencies operating inside Myanmar and/or by funding “cross-border aid.” These approaches were shaped by isolationist policies and concerns that aid would be misappropriated by and bolster an illegitimate military regime.

Cross-border aid organizations include health, education and other service provision “wings” of ethnic armed organizations, along with community-based organizations that serve local communities in border areas under EAO control.

Rebel soldiers of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) manning rifles on a supply route from Laiza, a KIA-controlled stronghold in Myanmar’s northern Kachin state on the border with China. Photo: AFP/Patrick Bodenham
Rebel soldiers of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) manning rifles on a supply route from Laiza, a KIA-controlled stronghold in Myanmar’s northern Kachin state on the border with China. Photo: AFP / Patrick Bodenham
They channel international assistance into Myanmar from a management and logistics base in a neighboring country (commonly, Thailand), but their staff come from and work within ethnic communities inside Myanmar.

In the past, donors described funding for cross-border aid as a way to support actors who were seen as legitimate “agents of change” in Myanmar.This amounted to a “solidarist” approach “employing humanitarian action within a political strategy on behalf of victims.” But when donors’ political aims in Myanmar shifted, so too did definitions of legitimate humanitarian action.

When Thein Sein’s government came to power in 2011, donors were encouraged by indications of political change in Myanmar and keen to engage with the new reformist leadership. Major Western donors were also influenced by broader geopolitical considerations, as they attempted to counter China’s influence in the region and to compete for stakes in Myanmar’s developing market economy.

Many donors shifted to channeling aid through official mechanisms inside Myanmar. In this evolving politics of international aid, cross-border aid organizations faced significant funding cuts. These cuts were often justified by claims that cross-border organizations were too political, or non-neutral, with the latter becoming synonymous, in the lexicon of many influential stakeholders at the time, with “un-humanitarian.”

Nevertheless, over the past decade, ethnic and community-based service providers have continued to provide essential services to local populations in border areas.

With conflict and displacement now increasing in the border areas, and with Civil Disobedience Movement members and other civilians from urban areas fleeing to areas controlled by EAOs, ethnic and community-based service providers are facing increased demand for their services. Some of these organizations are also at the forefront of responding to Covid-19.

These organizations therefore have the human resources and networks in place to respond in Myanmar’s current crisis. But they are in desperate need of funding. Funding them would obviously not be a neutral act.

But rather than trying to be neutral, what is important is that international donors and aid organizations do no harm. To achieve this, priority should be given to support that will not legitimize the State Administration Council.

At the same time, priority should be given to working with community-level and civil-society actors in ways that enable the provision of life-saving assistance and that demonstrate real commitment to decolonizing aid. As Myanmar activist Khin Ohmar argues, working around ethnic and community-based organizations rather than with them “represents a continued colonization of aid practices – a denial of locals’ agency.”

This picture taken on July 14, 2021, shows people waiting to fill up empty oxygen canisters outside a factory in Yangon, amid a surge in the number of Covid-19 coronavirus cases. Photo: AFP / Ye Aung Thu
To assist populations in conflict-affected border areas, international donors should fund cross-border aid, and international NGOs and UN bodies should work with ethnic and community-based service providers as equal partners, supporting the distribution of aid through these organizations.

To address the Covid-19 crisis, support should be coordinated with the Covid-19 Task Force, formed by the National Unity Government and ethnic health organizations.

This is important to address immediate humanitarian needs, but also to contribute to longer-term development and peace-building aims.

Myanmar’s military coup and defunct peace process highlight what many had said all along: that equitable development and lasting peace will never be achieved without real, systemic change – without reducing the control of the Bamar military elite over the state and without recognizing and strengthening ethnic service and governance systems.

Supporting and building the sustainability of ethnic and community-based service systems will help to address some of the structural inequities and injustices that have fed into decades of conflict in Myanmar.

At the same time, populations in more central, government-controlled areas are also in dire need of humanitarian aid. To access these populations, international NGOs and UN agencies should listen to civil society and community-level actors, and work with these actors in ways that limit involvement from the State Administration Council and that enable true localization of humanitarian decision-making and responses.

Moreover, with Myanmar’s current Covid-19 crisis presenting severe risks for the wider region, there is a clear impetus for a regional response.

Diplomatic and political pressure must be exerted by international donor countries on Myanmar’s neighbors, to allow for unrestricted cross-border humanitarian operations. At the same time, pressure must also be exerted on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and neighboring countries to help negotiate access for the Covid-19 response and advocate for the protection of health workers across the country.

With Myanmar’s human-rights crisis forcing international actors to recognize that aid is politicized and has political impacts, international donors and aid organizations must remain committed to provided life-saving humanitarian aid.

But in doing so, they must also demonstrate solidarity with the people of Myanmar, who have overwhelmingly rejected the military regime and continue to suffer because of its violent actions.

The full version of this article was originally published by Melbourne Asia Review, Asia Institute, University of Melbourne.

asiatimes

CSO STATEMENT: WHILE PEOPLE OF MYANMAR DEMAND SANCTIONS ON JUNTA RUN GAS ENTERPRISE, CHEVRON AND TOTAL BANKROLL ABUSES

2 August 2021

Today, six months and a day since the Myanmar military launched its coup d’etat, 462 civil society organizations (CSOs) made formal submissions to the E.U., U.K., U.S. and Australia demanding sanctions on the Myanma Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE). Sanctions should allow gas production to continue, but require revenues to be paid into protected accounts until a legitimate, democratic government is in power.

State-owned MOGE currently provides around 50% of Myanmar’s foreign revenue, estimated by the Myanmar government to be USD 1.54 billion per year. This money is being paid into accounts now controlled by the illegal regime, even as it commits atrocities, from air strikes on communities in ethnic areas to detaining and torturing peaceful protesters and journalists, while the devastating impact of a third Covid19 wave rips across the country.

The international community has pledged to support a return for democracy in Myanmar. The E.U., U.K., U.S., have sanctioned state-owned enterprises in the gems, pearl and timber sectors, stating that they fund the regime and its atrocities. The U.S. government has frozen USD 1 billion in assets of the Central Bank of Myanmar in the New York Federal Reserve Bank. It did so because the military is not entitled to these assets. Yet, they allow companies like Total and Chevron to continue to bankroll and legitimize the regime through the state-owned MOGE.

Meanwhile, Gas companies are publicly stating they must make or facilitate payments to accounts controlled by the regime to keep gas flowing on humanitarian grounds. This ignores that the calls of Myanmar’s lawmakers and civil society are only to stop revenue flows, not gas production. It dismisses our assessment, backed by Total’s own workers, that funding the regime is grossly more harmful than a possible reduction in electricity.

Total even cited a ‘human right to energy’ in Thailand, where much of the gas is exported, yet it likely knows the Thai government is trying to cut a massive oversupply of energy. Meanwhile, Chevron, is lobbying against sanctions and told civil society it was too busy to engage with them because it was prioritizing staff safety, despite apparently having no staff present in Myanmar.

Gas companies are telling the governments and EU bodies that they would be replaced immediately if revenues are cut off, raising concerns that ‘leverage’ would be lost. Yet gas revenues continue to flow, with Total suspending only 10% of payments from its Yadana project, so either there is no leverage or it is not being used. This amounts to a policy of “if someone pays the regime, it may as well be our companies.” In any case, Total’s Yadana project is complex, in decline and comes with huge political, financial and reputational risk. So whilst it is a medium-term lifeline to the regime, it is commercially unattractive, and even if an investor could be found, it would be at a financial cost to the regime.

That companies are simultaneously telling governments that they would be replaced quickly and easily and then publicly stating there would be severe humanitarian impacts indicates their disingenuous interests. These cannot both be true, and they’re both categorically false.

Myanmar’s civil disobedience movement (CDM) continues to resist the attempted coup. Whilst gas companies threaten power cuts, people across Myanmar refuse to pay electricity bills, and many government staff that collects payments are on strike. This is starving the regime of perhaps 10% of revenues. Only 52% of people in Myanmar are connected to the grid, and they are already experiencing blackouts amidst a tsunami of covid-19 as the military restricts access to oxygen and arrests doctors. This is why media survey showed that 98% of people in Myanmar prioritize cutting off revenues over the risk of power cuts.

Total’s decision to enter business with the regime in 1992 was catastrophic from a human rights perspective, but it was dealing with a recognized government. Now Total and Chevron are making and facilitating payments to accounts they know to be in the control of an illegal, terrorist army that’s overthrown the legitimate government.

If these companies have no leverage or will not use it, they should divest. Their continued presence legitimizes the regime and does nothing to mitigate the human rights impacts of investment. In failing to act, the governments of U.S., U.K. and E.U. and Australia are endorsing the bankrolling of the junta’s atrocities.

The time to act is now to support the CDM movement rather than undermining it. Both the governments and corporations must do so by taking all possible steps to reduce revenues from Myanmar’s offshore gas projects.

Background

The relevant governments have been given the names of the organizations that endorsed the submissions, but due to security concerns, their names have not been made public.

The Myanmar government has estimated gas revenues to be USD 1.54 billion per year. There is a long history of these revenues being misappropriated by the military through exchange rate manipulation and opaque accounting. Gas revenues sustained the regime in the 2000s and will do so again now.

Total and Chevron have stated that revenue payments from their Yadana project do not come from them but instead come from the gas buyer, PTT, a Thai state-owned company. Yet Total has also acknowledged that at least some of these payments by PTT to MOGE are made on Total’s behalf. The contracts between Yadana’s foreign investors (Total, Chevron and Thai company PTTEP) and MOGE suggest these companies can sell gas and ask PTT to then provide cash to MOGE. The contractual arrangements also require Total to act as a representative to MOGE when Total submits monthly invoices to PTT, which Total continues to do despite knowing that MOGE’s bank accounts have been taken over by an illegal regime. In addition, Total and Chevron authorize dividends to MOGE from the Motamma Gas Transportation Company (MGTC), the separate company that operates the pipeline taking gas to Thailand and in which they are the largest shareholders. Total and Chevron have suspended dividends from MGTC, but may resume them at any time. Total is also responsible arranging the payment of MGTC’s taxes, again into regime controlled accounts.

More details of these revenue flows are set out in a briefer by Publish What You Pay available at: https://www.pwyp.org/pwyp-resources/financing-the-military-in-myanmar-analysis-of-gas-revenues/


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Kani villagers find more bodies of civilians murdered by junta forces

A total of 40 corpses, most showing evidence of torture, have been discovered in the area over the past month

A dozen bodies were discovered near a village in Sagaing Region’s Kani Township on Friday, offering further evidence of atrocity killings by regime forces operating in the area.

The 12 bodies, including one of a 14-year-old boy, were found in a wooded area near the village of Taung Pauk on the afternoon of July 30, local sources said.

Days earlier, military forces entered Taung Pauk and other nearby villages and began arresting male residents suspected of involvement in the anti-coup resistance movement.

A search party was later formed to locate the detained villagers, all of whom appear to have been tortured and murdered on the day of their arrest.

“The bodies were very badly bruised. They had also started to decompose, to the point that you couldn’t pick them up. They were killed on the 26th or 27th, so that was understandable,” said a local activist who spoke to members of the search party.

Some of the bodies had been kept under a burned hut and were covered by a sheet, he added.

All 12 of the victims have been identified as villagers who were in the custody of the military at the time of their death.

Two were from the village of Kho Twin and seven—including the 14-year-old—were from Thayet Taw, another village in the area. The other three were residents of the town of Kani who were staying with relatives in Thayet Taw.

None of the bodies have been taken away for burial because the military is still active in the area, local residents told Myanmar Now.

This is the third time in less than a month that bodies have been found dumped near villages in Kani Township. A total of at least 40 have been discovered so far, most of them showing signs of torture.

On July 11 and 12, the bodies of 15 people were found scattered in a forest near Yin, a village that had been raided along with several others the day before.

At least 13 more bodies were discovered last week near the village of Zee Pin Twin following clashes between the military and the local People’s Defence Force (PDF).

The mass killings appear to be aimed at weakening support for the resistance movement, according to PDF fighters who insist that the regime’s brutal tactics are backfiring.

“People are joining us now to avenge their dead loved ones, even if they didn’t want to fight before. The military’s attempt to terrify people into submission doesn’t work anymore,” said one PDF member who didn’t want to be named.

Meanwhile, thousands of villagers have been displaced since the second week of July as clashes in Kani continue.

Most have been forced to seek refuge in forested areas due to fears that crowding into camps or other villages could lead to dangerous levels of exposure to Covid-19 amid a recent surge of the disease.

“We can’t make camps because of the pandemic. But we don’t have suitable shelter in the forest, which we need because it has been raining a lot. Aside from Covid-19, seasonal flu has been pretty bad,” said one displaced villager.

Myanmar Now News

Over 1,000 flee as junta attacks village in Magway following killing of local official

Soldiers burned down two houses and destroyed several others with the help of thugs from the military-backed Pyu Saw Htee group 

Wun Chone village in Magway Region, seen after the military’s raid (Supplied)
Wun Chone village in Magway Region, seen after the military’s raid (Supplied)

Over 1,000 people have fled a village in Magway Region’s Pauk Township after junta forces burnt down two homes there and raided or destroyed several others on Saturday when the administrator of a neighbouring village was killed, anti-regime guerilla fighters have said.

Members of the military-controlled Pyu Saw Htee group helped soldiers torch the houses in Wun Chone during a rampage through the village, a spokesperson for the guerilla group told Myanmar Now.

“They rampaged through the village and destroyed many shops as well as motorbikes,” he said, referring to testimony from five witnesses. “Many villagers have already fled, fearing they might come back.” Some fled to nearby woodlands while others sought refuge in surrounding villages.

There is a group of soldiers stationed at Pin Taung village, which sits two miles northeast of Wun Chone. The military arrived in Wun Chone immediately after the administrator of Pin Taung was assassinated at around 7am.

The soldiers clashed with guerilla fighters near Wun Chone before beginning their rampage. The guerillas’ spokesperson said none of the group’s fighters were killed in the clash and could not confirm if any of the junta’s forces were killed.

He added that the group’s fighters shot and killed Hti Myo, the 30-year-old administrator, because he supported the junta, and had ordered villagers in Pin Taung not to offer assistance to residents of Kinma village when it was burnt down by the junta’s forces in June.

Myanmar Now was unable to corroborate the allegations about the administrator.

A Wun Chone resident said soldiers also destroyed furniture during their rampage: “I went back to check last night. The fires burned the affected houses’ upper floors and sides. The lower floors were intact since they’re made of brick. I took what I needed and came back because there was a risk of running into Pyu Saw Htee there.”

Junta representatives could not be reached for comment.

Last week soldiers raided Thar Aye village in neighbouring Sagaing Region, displacing around 3,000 villagers, after an alleged military informant was shot and killed on July 28.

Around 10,000 civilians have been displaced by military attacks in the Sagaing townships of Kani, Yinmabin and Depayin since early July, according to local estimates.

Myanmar Now News