“Without Justice there can be no Peace”

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“Without Justice there can be no Peace”
Civil society expectations from the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference
Today the Government will host the second session of the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference in Naypyidaw. As civil society organizations (CSOs) have been barred from the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC)-led political discussions between the Government, Tatmadaw and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), ND-Burma has put together a summary of its 14 member organizations’ hopes, expectations and criticisms of the peace process. Our members’ key recommendations are as follows:

● Include all ethnic armed organizations in the political dialogue in order to make Panglong all-inclusive.
● Include civil society organizations in the political dialogue to benefit from their local expertise and community trust.
● Ensure any final peace deal commits to remove the Tatmadaw’s immunity clause from the 2008 Constitution in order to end impunity.
● Ensure any peace deal includes language acknowledging that human rights violations have been committed by all sides and that the Government will need to provide redress for victims.

“We welcome the efforts for peace. But as long as Panglong is not inclusive, peace is very far”

Assistance Association for Political Prisoners

Each of ND-Burma’s members said that they welcomed the peace process and stressed their desire for it to succeed. However, member organizations also argued that lasting peace could not be found under the current architecture of Panglong due to its lack of ‘inclusivity’. This was in reference to the Government’s exclusion of EAOs that have not signed the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), as well as civil society, from the core political negotiations of Panglong.

All members called on the Government to include all EAOs in the UPDJC-led political discussions, regardless of whether they have signed the NCA or not. Currently, nonsignatory EAOs have been invited as ‘special guests’ to Panglong, allowing them to submit papers to the and attend ceremonial meetings. At the time of writing the Northern Alliance of seven EAOs had decided to take up the invitation and attend as ‘special guests’, whereas the seven members of the United Nationalities Federal Council(UNFC) had not. These two groups of non-signatories account for 80% of rebel troops in Burma.

Members also highlighted the fruitlessness of peace talks if heavy fighting continues in northern Burma. The Kachin Women’s Association of Thailand (KWAT) in particular criticized the Tatmadaw’s ramping up of offensives against Northern Alliance member EAOs in advance of the Panglong conference. KWAT General Secretary Moon Nay Lin called this a “callous policy designed to pressure non-signatories into signing the NCA.”

Members also criticized the fact that non-signatory EAOs have not been permitted to hold national level political dialogues. Angshuman Choudhury of the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies has highlighted the deadlock this can create as certain EAOs do not wish to sign the NCA without consulting their ethnic support base.1 The KWAT has echoed this sentiment and urged the Government to respect EAOs as representatives of Burma’s ethnic nationalities, regardless of whether they have signed the NCA or not.

The All Arakan Students’ and Youths’ Congress (AASYC) also criticized the fact that national level political dialogue in Arakan State had been blocked by the Government, citing ‘sensitivities’ in the region. The AASYC said that this was a violation of the NCA as it prevented the signatory Arakan Liberation Party (ALP) from holding a national level political dialogue, while also preventing the Arakanese people from submitting their voices to the peace process.

“Panglong will never build lasting peace if it is just negotiations between those who hold guns”

Tavoyan Women’s Union

Our members also lamented the fact that civil society is only allowed to participate in peace talks through the Civil Society Forum, which is held in parallel to Panglong but limited to discussion on taxes, the environment, and religious affairs. Security and political issues are off the table.

This is despite the fact that CSOs, including the majority of ND-Burma members, are often deeply embedded in conflict-affected communities, providing civilians with humanitarian assistance and essential services. These organizations have both expertise and the trust of their communities. For example, the Palaung Women’s Organization operates a mobile medical clinic for those in remote locations without adequate healthcare, the Tavoyan Women’s Union provides reproductive health training to those who do not have access to it, and the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) provides education to ex-convicts.

Without grassroots involvement in the peace process, there is a danger that the negotiations will be seen as an elite power game between the Government and those who hold arms. Harn Yawnghwe, who heads the Euro Burma Office and has been heavily involved in the peace process, has argued that the lack of CSO and general public involvement in the peace process may help achieve some measure of progress in the short-term but will backfire in the end.

“When it comes to adopting the changes agreed in the peace process into the Constitution I believe people may vote no as they will not feel like they have ownership over what has been agreed,” says Mr. Yawnghwe.2 The Tavoyan Women’s Union summarised it as follows: “We fully support the spirit of Panglong, but it will never build lasting peace if it is just negotiations between those who hold guns.”

Indeed, academic research has consistently shown that the inclusion of civil society in peace-making helps achieve peace deals that last. One study showed that CSO involvement in a peace process reduced the risk of a return to violence by up to 64 percent.

“The 2008 Constitution only provides protection to the military. Panglong is our platform for changing that” Tavoyan Women’s Union

Our members unanimously agreed that lasting peace could not be found as long as Burma was under the 2008 Constitution and each organization saw Panglong as a forum in which constitutional amendments would be negotiated. However, members voiced their concerns over the fact that the Government and Tatmadaw were insisting on a finalized peace deal before any changes to the Constitution could be made.

Though previously campaigning for constitutional change and saying that a democratic transition without under the current charter was mere “window-dressing”, the NLD leadership now also insists the country must see national reconciliation before the Constitution is modified.4 The NLD Speaker of the House stated this explicitly last June and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi echoed his remarks during a recent visit to London.

ND-Burma’s members have pointed out that the current Constitution makes no mention of federalism or self-determination for Burma’s states, which results in a lack of trust from ethnic nationalities, who fear discussions at Panglong may be cosmetic. Indeed, the KWAT voiced its concern that the Government was using the Panglong name for political purposes without respecting the spirit of the original agreement, which enshrined “full autonomy in internal administration for the Frontier Areas.”

A recent Government decision to allow ethnic states and regions draft their own constitutions was cautiously welcomed by members, who anticipated that this would enable previously excluded civil society voices to provide valuable input. However, member also criticized the fact that states’ charters were in no way permitted to challenge the 2008 Constitution. The AASYC said: “We are concerned that while Burma is under the 2008 Constitution it will be impossible for states to draft constitutions based on genuine federal principles which guarantee their right to political selfdetermination – including the all-important right to control natural resources.”

Members also highlighted the fact that trust would be impossible as long as the Tatmadaw was guaranteed total autonomy over its affairs, including legal immunity.5 Moon Nay Lin from the KWAT said: “The Tatmadaw has long used the immunity clause in the Constitution to commit grave human rights violations with impunity, with the most systematic abuses occurring in ethnic nationality areas. As long as this clause is not removed from the Constitution, we can have no trust that these violations will not continue.”

“Without justice there can be no peace”

Kachin Women’s Association of Thailand

ND-Burma’s members unanimously agreed that lasting peace could not be achieved without all those in positions of power and trust acknowledging and providing redress for systematic human rights abuses. Members highlighted the fact that without recognition of the abuses that have been committed, people had no guarantees that the violations would not recur and trust would be impossible as a result. As any peace agreement reached would serve as the basis for changes to the Constitution, members said that they would continue to push for language relating to recognition and redress in any peace deal.

Our members also argued that institutional reform was key to stitching together a durable peace deal. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) argued that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) on the side of EAOs – what

Burma expert Bertil Lintner has dubbed “unconditional surrender” – had to happen alongside security sector reform (SSR) on the Government’s side.6 Only through institutional reform would it be possible to begin to re-build trust following decades of systematic abuse by security forces in Burma.

Providing victims with redress also makes economic sense: research has shown that implementing post-conflict justice mechanisms can increase the amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) a country receives, as it signals a concrete commitment to peace.7 A recent slowdown in foreign investment in Burma must at least partially be attributed to the re-escalation of conflict in a number of areas and the Government’s refusal to discuss transitional justice.

“We need to be farsighted, courageous enough to take risks in the interest of the generations to come”

In her speech commemorating 70 years since her father’s first attempt at peace, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi said that to succeed, “we need to be farsighted, courageous enough to take risks in the interest of the generations to come.” Acknowledging the horrific abuses that have been perpetrated by all those holding guns in Burma will take great courage indeed, but it is the only way lasting peace can be found.

 

About ND-Burma

ND-Burma is a 14-member organization whose members represent a range of ethnic nationalities, women and the LGBTI community. We have been documenting human rights abuses and fighting for justice for victims since 2004. 1. Assistance Association for Political Prisoners – Burma
2. Burma Issues
3. Human Rights Foundation of Monland
4. Kachin Women’s Association – Thailand
5. Kachin Development Networking Group
6. Palaung Women’s Organization
7. Ta’ang Students and Youth Organization
8. Tavoyan Women’s Union

Affiliate Members

1. All Arakan Students’ and Youths’ Congress
2. Chin Human Rights Organization
3. EarthRights International
4. Equality Myanmar
5. Lahu Women’s Organization
6. Pao Youth Organization

 

The Place of Reconciliation in Transitional Justice

Paul Seils

The term reconciliation has long been associated with the field of transitional justice and is often presumed to be one of its goals. At the same time, reconciliation has been both controversial and vague as a concept, giving rise to different understandings and approaches. This paper presents possible understandings of the concept of reconciliation as well as its relationship to the field of transitional justice.

Download the briefing paper here.

Reconciliation is a complex set of processes that involve building or rebuilding relationships, often in the aftermath of massive and widespread human rights violations.
It can occur at the individual, interpersonal, socio-political, and institutional levels and be described as “thin” if it is based on coexistence with little or no trust, respect,
and shared values, or “thick” if it is based on the restoration of dignity, reversing structural causes of marginalization and discrimination, and restoring victims to their
position as rights bearers and citizens.

Despite its complexity and contingency, reconciliation does occur in societies left fractured by conflict or repression, with transitional justice processes capable of contributing
to it through their outcomes and processes of discourse and participation. Context is a critical factor shaping reconciliation processes and their aims: fragile settings
may emphasize resilience; conflict settings may emphasize peaceful coexistence; and massive displacement settings may emphasize return and reintegration. Different
types of reconciliation can occur to varying degrees, alone or in combination.

What are the different types of reconciliation?

Individual Reconciliation: In order to rebuild their lives and their relationships with others, victims may have to reconcile themselves with their past experiences, including the harms, suffering, and damage that have resulted from human rights violations. While this is a conception of reconciliation that is often overlooked, it emerges frequently in work with victims.

Interpersonal Reconciliation: Often focusing on the relationship between victims, perpetrators, or beneficiaries of rights violations, interpersonal reconciliation can involve processes based on acknowledgement of past wrongs, reform, and forgiveness between individuals. This type may draw on religious understandings of reconciliation.

Socio-political Reconciliation: Socio-political reconciliation focuses on relations between groups—social, political, ethnic, religious, or other—in divided societies. In contexts where existing parliamentary and other structures may be relatively strong, processes may lead to respect for others who hold different beliefs and to a commitment to resolve differences through agreed-on, non-violent means. In other contexts, where society has no political history of strong institutions, agreements can commit to acknowledgment of harms done and respect for others the future.

Institutional reconciliation: Institutional reconciliation is premised on processes whereby institutions charged with protecting fundamental freedoms and individual and collective rights win back the trust of alienated parts of society. It is often focused on justice and security institutions but can also affect institutions such as education and the media. It is relevant not only where there are relatively strong state institutions, but also where those institutions have significantly breached the public trust by committing, facilitating, or allowing massive violations.

To what degree can reconciliation be established?

Relationships can be built or rebuilt in different ways and to different degrees. This is often discussed in terms of “thin” or “thick” reconciliation, although the distinction is not always clear cut. Furthermore, reconciliation can play out on the vertical and horizontal axes to smaller or greater degrees.

  • Thin or minimal understandings of reconciliation, at one end of the spectrum, involve individuals, groups, and institutions peacefully coexisting but with little or no trust, respect, restoration of dignity or shared values between them.
  • Thicker versions of reconciliation, on the other end, involve relationships built on trust, respect, and shared values, which may all contribute to the restoration of dignity that may have been lost as a result of violations.

Restoring dignity in this sense may require processes aimed at countering negative attitudes, restoring those who suffered violations to their proper position as rights bearers and citizens, and reversing or reducing the structural causes of marginalization and discrimination. It takes seriously the social and economic harms that have been caused by violations and taking steps to remedy them.

How does context affect reconciliation?

As with transitional justice generally, context determines to a large extent what reconciliation means, what relationships need to be restored, and how much progress can be made.

Religious and other beliefs

In South Africa, the discourse of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission emphasized largely a religious conception of reconciliation. It also invoked the notion of Ubuntu, an ethical approach that emphasizes common humanity in order to promote broader concepts of healing and harmony. In Chile, the transition was more about the need to overcome societal divisions between the political left and right, and respect the rule of law, and protection of human rights.

Restoring trust

In Argentina, the emphasis was less on fostering respect for different political beliefs and more on restoring trust in state institutions and the demonstration of their efficacy in protecting human rights. In particular, there was a need to restore the military as an institution to its place in the democratic order and in reestablishing the rule of law over state terror.

Fragile states

In contexts of fragility, where institutions are weak and resources scarce, a development lens may emphasize the importance of reconciliation for notions of resilience—the capacity to absorb, recover from, and resist shocks and crises, including systemic rights violations. Resilience in peacebuilding contexts is seen to include psychosocial recovery, social cohesion, and inclusive governance; development practitioners connect more resilient societies with levels of reconciliation and trust.

Conflict-affected states

In contexts of conflict-affected states, a security lens may emphasize the importance of reconciliation for peaceful coexistence. The dynamics of armed conflicts can be more complex than those of authoritarianism, particularly in terms of the range of non-state armed actors involved, the cross-border movement of combatants, and the scale and nature of violations committed. Reconciliation is likely to involve the reintegration of ex-combatants into their communities, often through local or traditional practices.

Large-scale displacement

In contexts of large-scale displacement, which are very often those of fragile and conflict-affected states, the notion of return may emphasize the importance of reconciliation for their reintegration. Reintegration may depend on reconciliation between returnees and state institutions, which failed to protect them, as well as between returnees and those who remained in their communities for the duration of the conflict. The restoration of dignity may require specific measures, such as the restitution of land and property, and addressing any psychosocial or socioeconomic damage done.

Are reconciliation and justice compatible?

While processes of transitional justice and reconciliation may interact, the two notions should not be conflated. Reconciliation as an outcome is only one of the potential objectives of transitional justice, and its relevance depends on each context.

To the extent that transitional justice processes succeed in recognizing victims, restoring trust in the state and one’s fellow citizens, and preventing future violations, they may positively contribute to vertical and/or horizontal reconciliation in different contexts.

In Argentina, the prosecution of the military leadership and the reparations program implemented for victims were important in restoring trust in the institutions of democracy and in placing the military in its rightful place in that context. In Chile and South Africa, a great deal of weight was placed on making the truth known about what had happened, why, and which institutions were responsible through their truth and reconciliation commissions.

To the extent that transitional justice processes succeed in recognizing victims, restoring trust in the state and one’s fellow citizens, and preventing future violations, they may positively contribute to vertical and/or horizontal reconciliation in different contexts.

Potentially more important for reconciliation than the results of specific mechanisms, however, are the processes through which those mechanisms come about—the discourse in which they are discussed, the decisions through which they are shaped, and their participatory nature.

Processes, therefore, embrace consultation, media relations, gender sensitivity, political alignment, and broad civil society engagement. The case of transitional justice fostering divisions, if seen as lacking legitimacy or impartiality, is likely if it is inappropriate for the context or without participation and transparency. Reconciliation may have negative connotations if it is promoted by actors as the only possible outcome, as a substitute for accountability and recognition, or as a synonym for criminal justice.

Where are some recent examples of transitional justice and reconciliation?

Morocco, 1990s to Present

After decades of abuses committed by the government, Morocco began to undertake a multi-stage political reform process in the country. This process, through which reconciliation became part of the public discourse, included granting amnesty to political prisoners and the return of the forcibly disappeared; creating an arbitration body to grant reparations to victims; and establishing the Equity and Reconciliation Commission (IER).

A number of different measures have contributed to reform, including: individual and community reparations; history and memory initiatives; addressing structural issues that led to prior violations; and the re-establishment of trust between citizens and the state. Reconciliation in Morocco at one level has involved a socio-political process, through the creation of a political community based on democratic values. Contributing to this was the acknowledgement of the country’s social and cultural diversity in formal processes. At another level, reconciliation has involved reestablishing trust between citizen and state institutions, further emphasized by civil society activism.

Tunisia, 2011 to Present

Since the overthrow of the previous government, Tunisia’s transition has focused on addressing the Ben-Ali regime’s legacies of abuse and corruption while preventing their recurrence. This has included passing a Transitional Justice Law in 2013, which established a Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC) to examine and report on past abuses and the Specialized Judicial Chambers to pursue criminal accountability. While a lack of understanding of reconciliation still exists, it is understood in terms of personal and collective dignity, political recognition and reform, economic justice, equality, social stability, and restoring victims’ rights.

Discourse in Tunisian society involves the idea accountability should prelude reconciliation, and the relationship between the state and citizens should be reformed through the judiciary. There are also strong beliefs that reconciliation will require the recognition of long-term social exclusion and regional inequality through advocacy of civil society and the continued transitional justice process.

Syria, 2011 to Present

Syria presents an extremely challenging context for reconciliation processes because of ongoing conflict, atrocities, and almost half of the country’s population is displaced. Steps should be taken now to ensure the participation of displaced persons and other victims in discussions about return and reconciliation upon a political settlement being reached. The priorities among refugees for a return process include security, the assurance of basic needs, access to government services, psychosocial support and family reunification. Significant divisions have emerged and the make-up of Syrian society, as well as divisions between those who left and those who remain, will make progress toward reconciliation complicated.

The term coexistence is more common than reconciliation, referring to re-establishing social ties, and is seen as an obligation. Dignity is another term used by many refugees, which is related to reconciliation, because loss of dignity is viewed as one of the most significant harms of the displacement experience. Many seek tribal justice mechanisms because of mistrust of national and international judicial systems. Interviews with refugees and civil society actors highlight the harms and losses experienced by Syrians, both individually and collectively.

AAPP and PEN Myanmar (2017) Scorecard Assessing Fredom of Expression in Myanmar

The group evaluated situations in six particular areas—laws and regulations, media independence and freedom, digital freedom, freedom of assembly, speech and opinion, right to information, and safety and security—with a scale of 10 points for outstanding achievement and 0 for regression in each area.

According to the indicators, the NLD government only achieved 8 out of 60 points in all six areas—1.3 points on average for each sector—which reflects a situation between “no progress” and “very little progress” regarding freedom of expression.

Please follow the following link to view the report:

First Annual Freedom of Expression Scorecard

ND-Burma Statement on the International Day for the Right to the Truth Concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims

ND-Burma Statement on the International Day for the Right to the Truth Concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims

On the International Day for the Right to the Truth Concerning Gross Human Rights Violations and for the Dignity of Victims ND-Burma calls on the NLD-led government and ethnic armed organizations to publicly acknowledge that grave human rights abuses have been committed by all parties and continue to be perpetrated in the context of Burma’s ethnic conflict.

ND-Burma has been documenting human rights abuses since 2004 and has a database of over 6,000 bulletins detailing a range of violations. Sadly, this database continues to get bigger with every year and 2016 actually saw a dramatic increase in violations documented – almost double the number recorded in 2015.

So far, the NLD-led government has remained silent on past as well as ongoing human rights violations, the large majority if which are perpetrated in ethnic nationality areas. Ethnic armed organizations also deny all allegations of human rights violations, such as forced recruitment.

ND-Burma believes that the failure to acknowledge abuses has emboldened security forces and led to the large increase in violations seen last year. A refusal to take stock of Burma’s bloody past has resulted in atrocities escalating under its first civilian-led government in more than half a decade. This has quickly destroyed the already fragile trust between the different parties in the peace process and led to negotiations fraying mere months after the opening of the 21st Century Panglong Peace Conference.

ND-Burma will soon be publishing the results of its needs assessment outlining what action victims require in order to rebuild their lives. The assessment will be based on victims’ testimonies and we expect these requirements to be incorporated into negotiations on the peace process.

Less than a year of the new government took office, ethnic conflict continues to rage and Burma’s people are experiencing the same violations of their rights as under the military regime. It is time to begin healing the wounds of the past in order to build lasting peace.

About ND-Burma
ND-Burma is a 13-member organization that includes organizations representing a range of ethnic nationalities, women and the LGBTI community.

Our members are:
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners – Burma
Burma Issues
Human Rights Foundation of Monland
Kachin Women’s Association – Thailand
Kachin Development Networking Group
Ta’ang Women’s Organization
Ta’ang Students and Youth Organization
Tavoyan Women’s Union (TWU)

Affiliate members:
All Arakan Students’ and Youths’ Congress
Chin Human Rights Organization
EarthRights International
Equality Myanmar
Lahu Women’s Organization
Pao Youth Organization
Association of Human Rights Defenders and Promoters

WCRP releases “Cracks in the Silence: Sexual violence against children and challenges to accessing justice in Mon State and Mon areas of southeast Burma”

March 23, 2017

Today HURFOM’s Women and Child Rights Project (WCRP) releases their latest report, “Cracks in the Silence: Sexual violence against children and challenges to accessing justice in Mon State and Mon areas of southeast Burma.”Report in English | Burmese

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ND-Burma’s 31st Network Meeting

5-7 January 2017: ND-Burma held its 31st Network Meeting in Mae Sot. All ND-Burma member organizations were present, including the Former Political Prisoners Society (FPPS), the Pa-Oh Youth Organization (PYO), Human Rights Defenders and Promoters (HRDP) and the Human Rights Documentation Network (HRDN).

At the meeting we evaluated the decisions taken at the previous Network meeting and reviewed what had thus far been implemented. We also discussed future activities and members proposed a number of research and advocacy initiatives.

Progressive Voice (previously Burma Partnership) also joined and discussed ways it could collaborate with ND-Burma and its members.